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Climate change is a reality, growing in significance as the
potential for rapid and severe disruption of ecological and social
systems looms ever larger. Transformations such as ecosystem
collapse, dramatic sea level rise, and a host of other
disturbances of biophysical systems threaten social and
economic stability. Against these risks, the world’s
governments have struggled in international negotiations to
arrive at even the most modest and clearly insufficient
agreements,1 while the United States continues to lack
protective environmental policies to limit greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions.2 The need for a new approach is widely
recognized3 and exceptionally urgent. One promising avenue
for developing such an approach lies in reconceptualizing
climate change mitigation as an emergent property of the
global energy system.
A growing body of legal literature has begun examining
energy law—a field which evolved separately from, and has
only occasionally been significantly constrained by,
environmental law—in an effort to promote development of
clean technologies that can ultimately help mitigate climate
change.4 The present Article also aims to promote renewable
1. See infra Part I.D.4.
2. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 246–48
(2011) (providing a historical summary of U.S. climate change initiatives).
3. See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012
FACTSHEET 1 (2012) [hereinafter IEA FACTSHEET] (“Taking all new
developments and policies into account, the world is still failing to put the
global energy system onto a more sustainable path.”).
4. For examples from U.S. legal literature, see JOSEPH P. TOMAIN,
ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 233–34 (2011)
(“Historically, energy and the environment were separate ways of viewing the
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energy technology with a goal of climate change mitigation, but
offers a different perspective than other recent U.S. legal
scholarship oriented toward this goal. Rather than focusing on
how the substance or structure of energy and environmental
law could be modified, this Article reconceptualizes climate
change in order to explore the potential for developing
governance reforms that may rapidly advance mitigation goals
by catalyzing a transformation of the global energy system. If
climate change can appropriately be understood as a threat to
global socio-ecological systems brought about by the
configuration of the existing global energy system, viable
solutions will be those that ultimately reconfigure the global
energy system.
Drawing on complex systems theory,5 particularly as it has
been applied in the interdisciplinary socio-ecological systems
literature and U.S. environmental law analysis, I suggest that
climate change can be understood as an emergent property of
the global energy system arising from a highly resilient system
state in which fossil-fuel-based technology dominates and GHG
emissions remain high. This perspective leads to policy
recommendations for addressing climate change aimed at
catalyzing a transformation of the global energy system to
dislodge fossil fuel dominance and initiate large-scale diffusion
of renewable energy technologies. Thinking of reforms in these
terms offers hope, perhaps the last hope, for significant nearterm mitigation on a global scale because it can avoid the major
political challenges that have plagued environmental law
world . . . . A smart energy future recognizes the interrelatedness of energy
and environmental strategies.”); Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the
Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 491 (2010) (“Putting
energy law and environmental law side by side yields an immediate contrast.
The fields work toward different ends.”); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and
Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1682
(2012) (“[A]n implicit support structure for fossil energy is written
into . . . environmental law, and . . . inevitably distort[s] how the costs of
bringing new energy technologies to scale are perceived.”); Amy J.
Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 381 (2011) (finding that
“environmental law and energy law do very different work[;] [t]hey have
different aims,” as the former seeks to protect health and conserve resources
while the latter promotes economic development); see also Hari M. Osofsky &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 829–31
(2013) (explaining the substantive overlap between environmental and energy
law).
5. See infra Parts II, III.
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approaches, including international treaty negotiations6 and
passage of comprehensive national legislation in the United
States.7 Instead, this approach involves identifying and
changing components of the global energy system that may
accrete, interact, and react in ways that magnify their impact,
promoting a transformation toward an alternative, low-GHG
trajectory of the system.
Although necessarily uncertain and tentative, this
approach is neither wishful nor magical thinking, as it might at
first appear to someone who has focused exclusively on linear
and incremental policy reform. Instead, this approach applies
widely recognized processes of complex systems, through which
relatively small adjustments to components of the current
system state can shift the momentum away from reinforcing
the current state (fossil energy dominance) through adaptive
processes and toward a fundamentally different system state
(such as a renaissance of renewable energy technology).8 The
proposal is apparently novel in the legal literature,9 but fits
well with recent work in other disciplines, including a
significant body of socio-technical systems research and

6. See infra Part I.D.4.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.
9. Research for this article did not uncover any articles by legal scholars
or in legal journals discussing the approach to mitigation proposed here. Only
English-language literature was searched, and U.S. legal literature was
reviewed most thoroughly. Moreover, it is important to note that J.B. Ruhl has
long suggested that complexity theory offers an important perspective on
environmental law problems and the legal system in general. See generally
J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-andSociety System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity
Theory]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl,
Thinking]. Other works suggest that energy policy must be understood as the
context in which climate change should be addressed. E.g., Susann Handke &
Ellen Hey, Climate Change Negotiations in a Changing Global Energy
Landscape: A Wicked Problem, 2 EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, Sept. 4,
2013, 1, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/ESIL%20Reflections%20%20Handke%20and%20Hey.pdf. One article, written contemporaneously with
the present Article, suggests that the global energy system can be understood
as a complex system. Frank A. Felder, Climate Change Mitigation and the
Global Energy System, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2014). The present proposal
may, therefore, be understood as a synthesis, rather than a truly novel
proposal. Yet, “there is nothing new under the sun.” Ecclesiastes 1:9.
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nascent political science work developing a methodology for
identifying appropriate components of legal and political
systems to target in order to take advantage of path
dependency characteristics and promote the emergence of more
effective approaches to global environmental change.10 The
proposal may also find empirical support in case studies of
smaller-scale energy system transformations, such as Brazil’s
move away from fossil energy in the 1970s.11
The analysis in the balance of this Article suggests that, at
a minimum, the proposal has sufficient promise to warrant
further research, as well as serious consideration by policy
makers and advocacy organizations throughout the world. Part
I highlights the failure of environmental law approaches to
produce an effective international climate change mitigation
response,12 and offers a sketch of several major aspects of the
global energy policy landscape that suggest its complexity. Part
II briefly discusses complex systems theory as it has begun to
influence environmental law scholarship. Part III makes
explicit the claim that climate change can be understood as an
emergent property of the global energy system and highlights
complexity theory concepts to inform law and policy related to
mitigation, noting particularly the importance of technology
and the undesirable resilience of systemic properties related to
climate change. Part IV concludes by offering some preliminary
suggestions for design principles and operational approaches
relevant to energy governance reform that could support a far
more effective response to the mitigation challenge.
I.

CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND
GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY

From the early 1990s through 2009, the primary focus of
efforts to address climate change was on the development of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) regime.13 The UNFCCC approach to climate change
can be understood as a classic or traditional environmental law

10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the
UNFCCC Process, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 82, 85–88
(2006) (discussing the development of the UNFCCC).
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response to an environmental problem.14 The regime’s goal is
framed in environmental law terms of harm prevention—“to
achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system”15—and the
means to do so were conceived in terms of quantifiable targets
for the reduction of GHGs.16 Further, most analysis under the
regime was framed by the “conventional” economic theory of
preventing a “tragedy of the commons,” which emphasizes the
need for a legally authoritative institution holding power to
impose sanctions for non-compliance with binding rules.17 As a
degree of success was achieved in advancing this structure
during negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol, significant
effort was devoted to developing “flexibility mechanisms” as a
means of reducing overall compliance costs.18
The effort to develop international climate change law in
UNFCCC negotiations drew on past environmental law
successes—particularly the success of the 1987 Montreal

14. Cinnamon P. Carlarne, The Future of the UNFCCC: Adaptation and
Institutional Rebirth for the International Climate Convention 5 (Ohio State
Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 172, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2148438_code1468587.pdf?a
bstractid=2148438&mirid=2 (describing mitigation policies as the “business as
usual” approach); see also William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and
the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen
Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457, 469 (2010) (describing how focus on
stabilization targets is currently the “dominant approach to climate
governance”); Schipper, supra note 13, at 82 (explaining that the UNFCCC
process was intended to focus on reversing changes in climate by mitigating
GHG emissions).
15. Schipper, supra note 13, at 86.
16. See id. at 84 (“[M]itigation focuses on the source of climate
change . . . .”); Carlarne, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the UNFCCC and
Kyoto Protocol as agreements that have adopted a “targets . . . approach to
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions”).
17. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action
and Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 551
(2010) (“The conventional theory of collective action predicts . . . [that] an
external authority is required to impose enforceable rules . . . . [There exists
the] presumption that collective-action problems that have global effects must
primarily be ‘solved’ by legal actions of a global authority . . . .”).
18. See generally Michael Grubb, Cap and Trade Finds New Energy, 491
NATURE 666, 666 (2012) (discussing how the “cap-and-trade” model utilized in
the Kyoto Protocol allowed countries a high level of flexibility in meeting
reduction targets).
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Protocol in addressing ozone depletion19 and the Acid Rain
Program of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments.20
However, the model of regulation represented by those
successful programs never fit well with the climate change
problem.21 Among other reasons, acid rain in the United States
and global ozone depletion were both caused by a discrete and
identifiable group of actors within developed countries, and
technological fixes to the problematic substances were available
(in the form of alternatives or pollution control devices), which
meant that framing the problems in terms of harm prevention
and compliance cost reduction was both accurate and
effective.22 Climate change, however, does not have either of

19. See, e.g., SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 282
(1999) (“[T]he Montreal Protocol has served . . . as a useful precedent and
model for the [UN]FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.”); Schipper, supra note 13, at
86 (mentioning that emissions reduction strategies were effectively used in the
Montreal Protocol).
20. The Acid Rain Program of the 1990 Amendments to the U.S. Clean
Air Act is widely recognized as the first large-scale successful use of a cap-andtrade program. See Lesley K. McAllister, Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of
Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J. ENERGY & CLIMATE L. 1, 4–9 (2010)
(discussing the success of the Acid Rain Program). During climate change
negotiations, in the words of one commentator, the United States “rammed a
global cap-and-trade model into the Kyoto Protocol.” Grubb, supra note 18, at
666. It appears that the success of the Acid Rain Program in cost effectively
reducing emissions provided motivation for U.S. cap-and-trade proposals
during Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to
Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973, 973 (2007) (suggesting that the design of the
Kyoto Protocol was influenced by successful regulation of acid rain, ozone
depletion, and nuclear proliferation in the 1980s).
21. E.g., Scott Barrett, Montreal Versus Kyoto: International Cooperation
and the Global Environment, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192, 192–219 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999)
(discussing the differing economic calculations affecting ozone and climate
change negotiations); Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (observing that the
UNFCCC regime approach to climate change was “inspired by” the Montreal
Protocol, but noting that “[c]limate change does not fit the parameters of the
ozone problem”).
22. See, e.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“The Montreal Protocol
was highly successful, as economically viable alternatives were available for
removing ozone-depleting gases from a limited number of products and
production processes.”); McAllister, supra note 20, at 4–8 (summarizing the
reasons for the success of the Acid Rain Program, including highly effective
emissions monitoring and enforcement policies).
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these characteristics.23 Instead, attempts to impose
quantifiable GHG emissions reduction targets raised deep
equity issues between developed and developing countries,24
while also posing a challenge that implicated the prospect of
requiring major changes across a wide range of economic
sectors (such as energy and transportation) without any clear
technological means of accomplishing them.25
The 2009 UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen marked a
decisive end of the collective illusion that a top-down, legalistic
model of the Kyoto Protocol could provide the authority
envisioned by “tragedy of the commons” metaphors.26 Since
then, scholars and policymakers have searched for alternative
means of addressing climate change by searching for lessons in
the failures of the UNFCCC process and by seeking alternative
approaches.27
A. ENERGY POLICY AS A CONTEXT FOR CLIMATE POLICY
One lesson from the failed UNFCCC efforts, which drives
much of the current interest in melding environmental and
energy law, is that context matters. As Elinor Ostrom noted,
“[t]here are no panaceas . . . for complex problems such as
global warming.”28 The Montreal Protocol worked in the
context of ozone depletion and the Acid Rain Program worked
23. E.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“Climate change does not fit
the parameters of the ozone problem. Thus far, there are no generally
accepted solutions let alone implementation paths.”).
24. See id. at 6 (“Implementing these agreements will require an
unprecedented level of cooperation . . . especially between the industrialized
world and emerging market powers. These efforts will have to go far beyond
the current stalemated negotiations between developed and developing
states.”); see also David Tackacs, Forest Carbon Offsets and International Law:
A Deep Equity Legal Analysis, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 521 (2010)
(proposing a concept of “deep equity” that is similar to the meaning implied
here).
25. See Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2, 5 (arguing that policies going
forward will “alter fundamental structures of our economy,” while highlighting
the notion that we currently have no generally accepted technological means
in place to implement new climate change policies and that “new technologies
and energy markets occasionally . . . lead to ‘backward’ fuel choices”).
26. See Dale Jamieson, Climate Change, Consequentialism, and the Road
Ahead, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 439, 444, 448–54 (2013) (examining “The Dream of
Rio” as a force-shaping climate policy and its end at the 2009 negotiations in
Copenhagen).
27. See infra Parts I.A–D, III.
28. Ostrom, supra note 17, at 555.
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in the context of the U.S. acid rain problem, but they did not
create one-size-fits-all prescriptive models.29 Addressing
climate change will require attention to the context in which
the problem arose and the development of contextually
appropriate strategies to change the behaviors causing the
problem.30
There are essentially two policy areas that constitute the
contexts from which climate change arose: energy and land use
(primarily deforestation).31 Each context raises its own unique
issues, opportunities, and challenges. This Article’s scope
examines energy, but there is one point worth noting about
deforestation. Somewhat ironically, while deforestation
received relatively little attention through the UNFCCC
regime, it has been the area of greatest agreement in recent
negotiations32 and produced an innovative REDD+33 program
that some, including myself, have suggested may hold clues as
to what more effective forms of climate regulation on a global
scale might look like.34 In line with the argument below, this
recent progress may be a result of the rather broad and flexible
principles that have framed discussions addressing
deforestation in the climate change regime, which have
fostered a wide range of innovative governance experiments at
multiple scales.35 Energy-based mitigation, by contrast, was
29. See supra note 22.
30. See Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 1–2 (suggesting that pre-existing
international efforts proceeded “without an agreed context” and suggesting
that “energy policy has to be a starting point if we wish to mitigate climate
change”).
31. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 458, 523–27 (looking at the recent
emergence of deforestation as “a major focus of climate policy” and the impact
of deforestation on global carbon emissions); Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 4
(discussing the difficulties in energy regulation due to the “current structure
of the energy sector” and global reliance on fossil fuels).
32. Boyd, supra note 14, at 458 (“[D]eforestation . . . has only recently
become a major focus of climate policy, emerging as one of the few areas of
consensus in the international climate negotiations.”).
33. REDD refers to reduced emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation.
34. E.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 471–73; Andrew Long, Global Climate
Governance to Enhance Biodiversity & Well-Being: Integrating Non-State
Networks and Public International Law in Tropical Forests, 41 ENVTL. L. 95,
163 (2011) (“Thus, the convergent legal mechanism suggested here for REDD
could be developed into a novel approach to multiple areas of global
environmental governance.”).
35. E.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 549–50.
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the subject of the most intensive, rigid, and detailed legal and
institutional development of the UNFCCC.36 Stepping back
from the narrow focus of the UNFCCC, however, we can see
that the primary features of the energy context that are
directly relevant to climate change are fossil fuel dominance
and the global scale of energy-related forces (including market
forces) that shape the policy arena.37 Indeed, fossil fuel
dominance of the energy sector is the single most important
reason for climate change risks.38
B. CLIMATE CHANGE: ENVIRONMENTAL HARM FROM AN ENERGY
PROBLEM
Climate change remains a major threat to humanity
primarily because GHG emissions are increasing,39 while a
robust scientific consensus has developed around the need for
dramatic decreases over the near-term in order to stabilize the
climate system.40 It would be hard to overstate the severity of
the problem. Global energy demand is rising dramatically and,
even assuming rapid development of renewables, the present
energy policy structure would meet approximately seventy-five

36. E.g., Schipper, supra note 13, at 82–83.
37. E.g., Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 5 (“Given the dominance of fossil
fuels, the implementation of bold climate measures will cause severe financial
and economic disruptions, as fossil-fuel based facilities worth hundreds of
billions would become ‘stranded assets’ and the use of renewables involves
much higher costs. Thus, government policies towards the energy sector have
great impact on the future global energy landscape and international climate
governance.”).
38. Cf. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
39. E.g., Howard Bamsey & John Christensen, Foreword to UNEP RISØ
CENTRE, ELEMENTS OF A NEW CLIMATE AGREEMENT BY 2015, at 4, 4 (Karen
Holm Olsen et al. eds., 2013) (finding that a comparison of UNEP’s 2011 and
2012 reports “indicate[ ] that global emissions are increasing”).
40. A number of recent studies analyze the extent of emissions reductions
needed to stabilize the climate system at a level of global average temperature
rise consistent with the two degrees Celsius goal established by UNFCCC
negotiations. See, e.g., Michel G.J. den Elzen et al., Analysing the Greenhouse
Gas Emission Reductions of the Mitigation Action Plans by Non-Annex I
Countries by 2020, 56 ENERGY POL’Y 633, 633 (2013) (concluding that, in order
to stabilize the climate at two degrees Celsius above the baseline, developed
countries would need to reduce emissions by fifty percent below 1990 levels by
2020 if developing countries meet their current pledges); see also Bamsey &
Christensen, supra note 39, at 4 (providing several analyses of “crucial
aspects” required to meet stabilization goals).
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to eighty percent of the demand with fossil fuels.41 The
International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that even with a
significant shift away from coal and oil, anticipated emissions
through 2035 correspond with a long-term global average
The
temperature
rise
of
3.6
degrees
Celsius.42
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
others predict major impacts on human health and natural
systems at that level of temperature change.43 For example,
that degree of climate change is likely to cause many terrestrial
ecosystems, such as the Amazon Rainforest, to undergo
dramatic transformation, if not collapse.44 Such transformation
will not only rapidly accelerate biodiversity loss and undermine
human well-being in the region, but also have implications for
hydrological cycles while transforming terrestrial ecosystems
into a net source of GHGs as they undergo fundamental
transformations, thus further accelerating climate change.45 In

41. DRIES LESAGE ET AL., GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD 2 (2010) (“[E]nergy demand is set to rise spectacularly in
the coming decades, especially in the emerging and developing world. Without
policy adjustments, global energy demand will increase by over 50 percent by
2030, and up to 80 percent of this demand will be met by fossil fuels.” (citation
omitted)); see also IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that fossil fuels
currently represent eighty-one percent of the global energy market, and will
only drop to a seventy-five percent share by 2035).
42. Cf. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (anticipating natural gas to
nearly overtake coal as an energy source by 2035, by which time rise in
energy-related CO2 emissions will have led to a long-term average
temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Celsius).
43. For example, the IPCC estimates a loss of approximately thirty
percent of coastal wetlands, significant disruption of food production, and the
net transformation of ecosystems from carbon sinks to carbon sources at
temperature increases of more than three degrees Celsius. M.L. PARRY ET AL.,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 11–12, 16 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf.
44. Chris Jones et al., Committed Terrestrial Ecosystem Changes Due to
Climate Change, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 484, 485 (2009), available at
http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/v2/n7/pdf/ngeo555.pdf (“There seems to be
a temperature below which the equilibrium state of the [Amazon] forest is
approximately constant, but above which the equilibrium forest cover declines
steadily with changing climate. This point could be seen as a threshold beyond
which some degree of loss of Amazon forest is inevitable.”).
45. See id. at 484–86 (using modeling to demonstrate committed
ecosystem damage in the Amazon that would result from increasing global
temperatures); see also PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 11–16 (discussing the
impacts of climate change on ecosystems and human health). Recent droughts
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short, projections of the energy system over the coming decades
suggest that GHG emissions will continue at such a level that
climatic changes will dramatically increase human suffering in
some parts of the world,46 cause significant and disruptive
impacts on natural systems (many of which are largely
unpredictable),47 and impose significant economic stress on
even the world’s most robust economies.48
Although climate change may be most familiar to us as an
environmental problem, this does not necessarily mean that it
will be most effectively regulated through environmental law
techniques. Climate change is part ecological concern,
particularly through its natural processes and impacts, and
part economic concern, particularly through its causes in the
energy sector.49 Thus, there are at least two ways to approach
regulation—one focused on the ecology of climate change and
one focused on the economy of climate change. The former
suggests an approach derived from working backwards from a
desired result in natural systems;50 the latter suggests an

in the Amazon region are affecting a significant portion of the forest, which
may suggest that climate change is already impacting the ecosystem. E.g.,
Jonathan Watts, Amazon Showing Signs of Degradation Due to Climate
Change, NASA Warns, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2013, 11:33 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jan/18/amazon-rainforestclimate-change-nasa.
46. See PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 13 (“Agricultural production,
including access to food, in many African countries and regions is projected to
be severely compromised by climate variability and change.”).
47. See id. at 8–11 (highlighting the impacts of climate change on
ecosystems and natural systems).
48. Lesage et al. suggest possible global depression given the importance
of fossil fuels in the world economy, for example, and note that Stern has
suggested climate change could impose economic costs equivalent to a five to
twenty percent reduction of consumption per person, LESAGE ET AL., supra
note 41, at 2, which is not to say it would be evenly distributed, of course.
49. See generally MALTE FABER & REINER MANSTETTEN, PHILOSOPHICAL
BASICS OF ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY 16–24 (Dale Adams trans., 2010)
(providing that the disciplines of ecology and economics “lay the foundation for
environmental education”).
50. See MICHAEL COMMON & SIGRID STAGL, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTION 506–10 (2005) (analyzing a potential, yet unrealistic, ecological
approach to climate change in the context of setting mitigation targets and
working backwards from the mitigation targets to determine how to effectively
achieve them).
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approach based on the human systems that have caused the
disturbances in the natural systems.51
The two words, “ecology” and “economy,” suggest the
differences in ecological and economic approaches to climate
change mitigation. Their common root “eco,” which derives
from the Greek word oikos (“house”), reflects that both involve
a form of “house-keeping.”52 The suffixes of “ecology” and
“economy” reveal their differences. “Ecology” includes a suffix
derived from the Greek word logos (“study”) and thus reflects a
“house-keeping” based on studying the entire planet, the
relationships of all organisms and processes that make up our
“home,” the Earth.53 “Economy,” on the other hand, includes a
suffix derived from the Greek word nomos (“order”) and thus
reflects a “house-keeping” of order created by humanity, the
management of human organization and interaction, rather
than a pre-existing natural system.54
Although overlapping and interdependent, ecological and
economic approaches to climate change mitigation can be
distinguished by the number of actors involved. Ecological
systems involve a myriad of living and non-living types of
actors or forces, while humans alone are the primary actors in
economic systems.55 Thus, an ecological approach will operate
from a broad consideration of all relevant processes and
components, such as the environmental law approach focused

51. See id. at 1–3, 12 (“The global scale of human economic activity is now
such that the levels of its extractions from and insertions into the
environment do affect the way that it works.”).
52. For this and related points, I am indebted to Jim Chen’s feedback on
an earlier draft of this article. Jim discusses “house-keeping” in Jim Chen,
Biolaw: Cracking the Code, 56 KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1031–32 (2008); see also,
e.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 16 (“The special significance of
ecology and economics is revealed as soon as we take a closer look at the two
terms themselves: ‘ecology’ and ‘economy’. Both share the component ‘eco’
which is derived from the ancient Greek word ‘oikos’, meaning ‘house’. Oikos
does not only mean the building itself, however, but refers to everything that
can be better summarised [sic] under the term ‘household’.”).
53. E.g., COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1 (“Ecology is the study of
nature’s housekeeping . . . .”); FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 18–20.
54. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 16–18; see also
COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1 (“[E]conomics is the study of
housekeeping in human societies.”).
55. COMMON & STAGL, supra note 50, at 1.
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on harm prevention.56 An “economic” approach in this sense,
however, will focus more directly on the human-created order
that gives rise to the climate change problem and, thus,
establish goals that seek to adjust the inputs and ordering of
human relations more than achieving a pre-defined outcome.57
Although either approach might be equally effective if fully
implemented, the difference in orientation may have profound
effects on the likelihood that either approach will be adopted
and effectively implemented. The UNFCCC experience
illustrates the challenge of employing an ecological approach to
regulation of complex global environmental problems—it often
seems as though the actors in climate debates spend more time
identifying processes and the goals of regulation than on
developing effective mechanisms to change the human behavior
causing the problem.58
An “economic” approach, as that term is used here (which
is explicitly not an endorsement of relying on markets), may be
more successful simply because it focuses almost exclusively on
human behavior, which (unlike ecosystem behavior) can be
altered directly by adjusting rules, changing incentives, and
employing other tools of regulation.59 Thus, while climate
change can be approached from several regulatory angles,
energy policy—concerned primarily with the economics of
converting resources into forms of energy suitable for human
use—may provide a more promising avenue than
environmental law.
While this initial argument for adopting an “economic”
approach to climate change through a focus on the energy
system relies on its relative simplicity, when compared with a
more holistic ecological approach, the next Part will shatter
any illusion that energy policy reform is a simple matter.60
Although focusing primarily on energy policy may avoid many
of the complications inherent in a broader focus on the impacts
of climate change, energy policy itself poses a host of challenges
to effective regulation, not the least of which is its complexity.
56. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 19–20 (“Ecology is the
science of the interactions of living creatures with one another and the abiotic
conditions within their environments.”).
57. E.g., id. at 16–24.
58. See infra Part I.D.4.
59. E.g., FABER & MANSTETTEN, supra note 49, at 20–23.
60. See infra Part I.D.
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That, perhaps, is the strongest argument for focusing
primarily, if not exclusively, on the “economic” order of energy
policy in pursuing mitigation—once the goal of climate change
mitigation has been accepted, there is no need to layer the
complicating factors of environmental law approaches on top of
the already complex challenge of energy system reform.
C. GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY AS THE CONTEXT FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE MITIGATION
If energy policy is understood as the appropriate context
for addressing climate change, the next question is whether the
appropriate scale of reform efforts is national or global.61
Recent U.S. energy law and policy scholarship addressing
climate change seems to focus on U.S. domestic policy.62 Unlike
much of this recent literature, this Article identifies global
energy policy as a context for climate governance.63
Articulating a reason to target U.S. energy policy, Joseph
Tomain suggests that “difficulties in bringing together all
nations in an effort to craft a climate change response [means
that] . . . . the prelude to the United States taking an
international leadership role is that domestically, it must take
seriously the need to put in place a low-carbon energy
economy.”64 However, Tomain also suggests that “we must
create future energy policy as a transformative moment, not
simply as an incremental transition moving slowly away from

61. Other scales are, of course, possible. A related question is the extent to
which reform should focus on encouraging individual behavior changes or to
concentrate primarily on changing energy sources and other systemic factors.
Compare Daniel A. Farber, Sustainable Consumption, Energy Policy, and
Individual Well-Being, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1523 (2012) (“[P]olicymakers
should give people the basis for making more informed, sustainable
consumption decisions, both about their direct energy use and about goods
such as water and food that require energy expenditures.”), with Wildermuth,
supra note 4, at 384 (describing individual voluntary actions as “far too little
and far too late,” and noting the relative difficulties of using this approach to
bring about significant change in emissions).
62. I have not systematically compared the volume of literature on
international and domestic policy, but research for this Article and related
projects suggests that U.S. environmental law scholars give significantly more
attention to domestic energy policy than to its larger-scale counterparts.
63. See supra note 9.
64. TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232.
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fossil fuels to new resources.”65 Although one can debate
whether a transformational moment is strictly necessary, rapid
transformation of energy practices would clearly provide
greater climate benefits than a slower, linear process of
incremental change.66 In my opinion, the urgency of climate
threats offers at least a preliminary reason to focus primarily
on developing responses to climate change at the global, rather
than national, scale. Attempting to improve U.S. energy policy
as a prelude to international negotiations is, itself, an
incremental approach in which each of the steps could take
decades to complete—decades during which developing country
emissions, in particular, are nearly certain to rise rapidly.67
Changes to global energy policy, on the other hand, have at
least the potential to reach a far larger share of total emissions
than any single nation’s policy and offers the option of
targeting the massive growth in developing country emissions
as an avenue for relatively rapid action (and relatively costeffective) on emissions.68 Thus, the potential for truly
transformational change appears greater at the global scale.
The unwieldiness of international politics and the
challenges of international law-making (as suggested by
Tomain) likely explain why some scholars focus on domestic

65. Id. at 234. A variety of views on this point are expressed in the
literature. See Davies, supra note 4, at 506 (“Change, especially big change,
takes time.”); Farber, supra note 61, at 1523 (“Change will be slow, but
practical first steps do exist.”); Outka, supra note 4, at 1681 (“This Article is
concerned with renewable energy’s too-slow transition and with how existing
legal regimes work to preserve fossil energy dominance.”). Nonetheless, there
is no serious debate over whether a transformation is necessary to address
climate change or that delay increases the risks posed by climate change. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., Outka, supra note 4, at 1680–83.
67. See TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232 (previewing the steps that the
United States must put in place to improve domestic energy policy); see also
Elzen et al., supra note 40, at 633 (“There are upward revisions of greenhouse
gas emission projections in many developing countries.”).
68. The projected growth in energy demand in developing countries is
clearly justifiable to the extent it meets important social objectives associated
with energy policy, such as relieving energy poverty. See Ann Florini &
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Bridging the Gaps in Global Energy Governance, 17
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 57, 66 (2011) (“Improved access to energy services is
arguably the key defining characteristic of economic development.”). Where
basic access to electricity is the motivation for capacity additions, financing to
support renewable technologies is likely to have a particularly direct effect in
lowering emissions. See id. at 66–67.
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policy despite the glaring need for global reform.69 While it is
true that global policies have the potential to affect emissions
throughout the world, there seems to be a greater certainty
that efforts will have at least some effect in domestic law—it is
more predictable, and actors are subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, unlike the traditional actors in international
law (sovereign states who can only be bound by their own
consent).70 International political actors now clearly include
corporations, civil society organizations, and others who
undoubtedly complicate the field,71 which may seem to make
global energy policy a particularly unappealing space for legal
scholars used to working in areas where lines of authority and
jurisdiction are, if not clear, at least comprehensible. The
unpredictability of the global political environment may seem
to make global policy reform as a strategy for climate change
regulation a riskier bet and, thus, one might prefer the small
but relatively certain progress that can be achieved with
domestic law reform.72
However,
this
apparent
argument
for
seeking
predictability in a smaller-scale context should be turned on its
head. The very complicated and, more importantly, complex
context of governing at the global scale offers a key reason for
scholars, and ultimately policymakers, to focus their energies
on developing approaches that draw upon the interactions that
characterize complex social and economic systems to unleash,
or perhaps just nudge, the forces that drive complex systems
toward inventing new pathways. These new pathways could be
capable of re-orienting the energy system onto a trajectory that
produces a low-carbon energy system far more rapidly than is
conceivable through incremental, domestic-first strategies or
the pre-existing track of UNFCCC negotiations.73
Maintaining a global focus in light of UNFCCC failures,
rather than retreating to familiar domestic law and policy
challenges with far less potential impact, forces us to change

69. See infra Part I.D.4; see also TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232
(“Copenhagen 2009, however, demonstrated the difficulties in bringing
together all nations in an effort to craft a climate change response.”).
70. See TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 234–35 (providing a number of principle
and policy suggestions for domestic energy policy).
71. See infra Part I.D.4.
72. E.g., TOMAIN, supra note 4, at 232, 234–35.
73. See infra Parts II, III.
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the way we think of the mitigation challenge and may thereby
reveal opportunities that are not available by adding up a
collection of component domestic environmental efforts.74
Climate change is a global phenomenon. This fact does not
undercut the need for attention to smaller scales, but it does
suggest that we should develop a multiscalar strategy that
includes a well-crafted global element (rather than a vague
hope for more effective negotiations if the United States
gradually reduces its emissions) capable of spurring the types
of interactions among reform efforts at all scales to produce the
necessary transformative global change as quickly as possible.
Examining energy policy on the global scale has the advantage
of allowing us to consider that interaction of components within
the undeniably global system that causes climate change, thus
calling attention to an array of possibilities for reinventing
global climate governance that cannot be seen when one
focuses on the domestic level. Before elaborating on the ways in
which focusing on the global energy system affects analysis of
mitigation strategy in Parts II through IV, it is useful to briefly
survey the terrain of global energy policy to elucidate some of
its components.
D. CHALLENGES AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE ENERGY POLICY
ARENA
Any hope to stabilize the climate system in the next few
decades without resorting to geoengineering will be a rapid
shift away from fossil-fuel dependent technologies on a large
scale.75 The technological and economic challenges of achieving
this shift are enormous.76 For example, the IEA reports that
74. This has begun to happen in the context of forestry-related GHG
emissions. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 470–73 (discussing REDD+ as perhaps
the best example of the type of “assemblages” needed to address global
environmental problems, such as saving the tropical rainforests); Long, supra
note 34, at 162–64 (discussing the potential for REDD+ to stimulate more
holistic environmental protection mechanisms). Relatively little literature
discusses reconceptualizing the energy mitigation challenge, however. For an
example, see David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty
Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 109–16 (2009) (discussing the
framing of climate-energy problems).
75. See Felder, supra note 9, at 95–97 (stating that stabilization of GHG
emissions in the next few decades would require “a complete overhaul of the
existing and proposed [global energy system]”).
76. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two
Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2007) (stating that perceptions of
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the additional electricity capacity required by 2035 is larger
than the entire installed capacity of the world in 2011.77 Much
of this added capacity is predicted to be fossil fuel dependent,
even with current and reasonably likely future renewable
energy promotion policies taken into account.78
Moreover, many aspects of the existing energy system are
socially reinforced through current legal, political, and
institutional arrangements.79 Thus, the absence of scalable and
reliable alternatives to fossil fuels, in the context of rising
demand for energy, combines with these factors to create a
global energy system in which fossil fuels are becoming more
deeply entrenched as the dominant energy source over exactly
the period in which rapid decrease of GHG emissions is
needed.80
The remainder of this Part highlights several of the most
prominent aspects of the global energy policy arena that pose
obstacles to significant reform. Perhaps the most prominent
the high costs of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, and of relatively low
benefit, provide “the central explanation” for why that agreement was less
successful than the Montreal Protocol); see also Barrett, supra note 21, at 200–
16 (advancing a similar argument and providing detailed discussion of specific
projections); Benjamin K. Sovacool, Rejecting Renewables: The Socio-technical
Impediments to Renewable Electricity in the United States, 37 ENERGY POL’Y
4500, 4503 (2009) (explaining that implementing renewable power
technologies challenge the existing energy system, and that the “process of
creating and adopting technologies is complex, interactive, and political”).
77. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that this would include
necessary replacement of existing capacity due to age).
78. Id. (expecting renewables to represent only half of the capacity
additions).
79. See, e.g., Rosemary Lyster, Renewable Energy in the Context of
Climate Change and Global Energy Resources 1 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 13/61, Aug. 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2315911 (listing a number
of significant barriers to the development of “renewable energy technologies”);
Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 4, at 780–807 (examining the impact of
physical, market, and regulatory forces on the U.S. energy system); Sovacool,
supra note 76, at 4501 (demonstrating that the “impediments to renewable
power” are “socio-technical,” encompassing “technological, social, political,
regulatory, and cultural aspects”).
80. See Felder, supra note 9, at 105 (“The GES is a large-scale system in
which no single, carbon-free, or scalable technology exists that would stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions in the relatively near future. It is an interconnected
and open system, providing vital services in and of itself, but also to other
complex systems such as transportation, communication, water, and
security.”); Lyster, supra note 79, at 17–18 (stating that fossil fuels are likely
to remain dominant).
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consideration in energy policy is economics.81 As a primarily
economic activity, one can argue that energy production is
driven largely by the market. However, as discussed below, the
energy market is severely distorted by subsidies, illustrating
that fossil fuel dominance is not purely an economic matter.82
Other considerations, including the very diffuse nature of
authority exercised over energy decisions at the international
level, complicate efforts to reform international energy policy.83
Thus, after briefly touching on economic considerations that
inhere to support the status quo, this Article highlights the roll
that energy plays at the nexus of several other social and
environmental issues, emphasizes the importance of energy in
geopolitical power distribution, and describes the existing
international energy governance structure, before subsequent
Parts explore how these illustrative elements of global energy
policy support conceptualizing climate change as an emergent
problem of the global energy system.
1. Economics and Energy Policy
As is widely recognized, economic considerations maintain
fossil fuel dominance in significant ways. Most obviously, many
investments in energy generation are sunk costs that cannot be
transferred or reinvested into another product or process.84 For
example, construction of an electricity generating facility
entails large up-front costs and relatively low operating costs.85
Accordingly, basic economic analysis encourages owners to
operate the facility until the costs of maintenance justify
constructing a new facility, effectively entrenching fossil fuel
generation at the facility for decades.86 However, isolating the
role of economic considerations in this way risks providing a
false picture of energy system dynamics.

81. See infra Part II.D.1.
82. See Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 64 (explaining that longestablished subsidies that benefit fossil fuels and nuclear energy pervert the
market and discourage the pursuit of alternative energy).
83. See infra Part II.D.4.
84. Felder, supra note 9, at 99 (“Much, if not all, of the initial investment
in energy assets are sunk, that is, irreversible.”); Sovacool, supra note 76, at
4504–06.
85. Felder, supra note 9, at 99–100.
86. See id. at 100–01.
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Economic considerations favoring fossil fuel technologies
are reinforced (perhaps even constructed) politically, most
directly through fossil fuel subsidies that have proven
exceptionally difficult to change.87 Collectively, states provide
as much as $700 billion in one year to economically support
fossil fuel production and consumption.88 These subsidies
distort the market and affect the global political economy of
energy.89 The contrast between fossil fuel subsidies and
renewable energy subsidies is stark: IEA estimates that 2011
combined global subsides for all renewable energy sources
amounted to $88 billion, while fossil fuel subsidies were six
times higher at $523 billion.90 Despite repeated pledges by
some of the world’s most powerful nations to begin reducing
fossil fuel subsidies, and even some modest action on those
pledges, the overall level of fossil fuel subsidies rose thirty
percent from 2010 to 2011.91

87. See Lyster, supra note 79, at 17–18 (stating that reforming fossil fuel
subsidies would significantly reduce GHG emissions, but that because of the
inbuilt subsidies to fossil fuels and “the failure to fully internalize the climate
and non-climate externalities,” fossil fuels are likely to continue being our
primary energy source).
88. The figure of $700 billion is an estimate of total fossil fuel subsidies in
2009 reported in the IEA, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World
Bank Joint Report. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF
ENERGY SUBSIDIES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE G-20 INITIATIVE 4 (2010)
[hereinafter G-20 JOINT REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/
env/45575666.pdf. The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI), an international civil
society organization, estimates $600 billion in fossil fuel subsidies, including
$100 billion in producer subsidies during the same year. Fossil Fuels - At
What Cost?, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, http://www.iisd.org/gsi/fossil-fuelsubsidies/fossil-fuels-what-cost (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). However, GSI also
notes that the actual value of subsidies is impossible to determine because
there is no international monitoring framework in place. Id. In any event, the
annual amount of fossil fuel subsidies fluctuates widely based on energy
prices, economic activity levels, and other factors. G-20 JOINT REPORT, supra,
at 4, 15.
89. See Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 64 (“These subsidies distort
the price signals that consumers receive . . . and artificially create demand for
both energy and its associated infrastructure.”); Lyster, supra note 79, at 12–
13 (discussing various fossil fuel subsidies that make it difficult for renewable
sources to compete “in terms of price”).
90. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, at 49, 66
(2012); Lyster, supra note 79, at 3–5 (discussing the IEA WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2012).
91. IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (“Subsidies to fossil fuels continue
to distort energy markets and expanded considerably last year despite
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Moreover, changing subsidy policies is not simply a matter
of reforming developed countries’ support for multinational
energy corporations. In some countries, consumer subsidies—
subsidies that effectively reduce the price of fossil fuels for the
end consumer—are employed by national regimes to maintain
popularity or diffuse public resistance to their rule.92 Countries
such as Russia, China, and Iran pour significant percentages of
their GDP (worth billions of U.S. dollars) into subsidizing fossil
fuels.93 These subsidies have created political situations in
which change can provoke volatile responses.94 In Nigeria, for
example, a decision to rapidly end fossil fuel subsidies resulted
in rioting in the streets and a hasty reinstatement of the
repealed policies.95
2. Social and Environmental Issues in Energy Policy
Global energy policy is also a node of connection many of
the major global social and environmental issues that are likely
to define the twenty-first century.96 The social and
environmental impacts of globally relevant economic variations
in the energy system can be very large, as evidenced by the
effects of oil price fluctuation on economies throughout the

international efforts at reform.”); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 90, at 71
(“G-20 and [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] member economies have made
commitments in recent years to phase out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies.”).
92. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 90, at 70 (explaining that due
to fossil fuel subsidies, consumers “paid only 76% of the reference or
unsubsidized price,” and that subsidies thus “reduce end-user prices below
those that would prevail in an open and competitive market”).
93. The economic value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for Iran
exceeded $80 billion in 2011, while Russia’s was close to $40 billion and
China’s exceeded $30 billion. Id. at 71.
94. James Kanter, Cost of Subsidizing Fossil Fuels Is High, But Cutting
Them Is Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
10/24/business/global/cost-of-subsidizing-fossil-fuels-is-high-but-cutting-themis-tough.html (“These subsidies are fiendishly difficult to dismantle because of
the political risks involved.”).
95. Monica Mark, Nigeria Reels After Oil Subsidy Row Turns into
Country’s Biggest Ever Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2012, 1:38 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/18/nigeria-power-struggleprotest-oil; see also Kanter, supra note 94 (citing an example from Bolivia).
96. As Florini and Sovacool explain, energy issues “form a common thread
across many of the most pressing global problems, cutting across geopolitical,
environmental, and economic dimensions.” Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68,
at 57.
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world.97 Social impacts emerging from the current state of the
energy system penetrate deeply in locally and globally
significant ways.98 Although climate change may well be the
most important long-term social and environmental challenge
of energy policy, there are a host of other major social and
environmental concerns to confront, such as widespread health
impacts from air pollution (especially in developing
countries),99 severe economic impacts resulting from dwindling
supply and rising demand,100 human rights abuse and other
socially damaging action by non-democratic national
governments enriched by fossil fuel resources (primarily oil),101
questions regarding the stability and sustainability of
agricultural production methods,102 water contamination and
overuse affecting human populations and natural systems

97. Felder, supra note 9, at 95–96.
98. See, e.g., Andreas Goldthau & Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Uniqueness
of the Energy Security, Justice, and Governance Problem, 41 ENERGY POL’Y
232, 238 (2012) (arguing that energy transitions are “susceptible to transform
the cultural and social fundamentals of entire nations”).
99. Even with the UNFCCC controls in place at the time, the U.S.
National Research Council estimated $62 billion in non-climate damages from
coal in 2005, which equates to $66/ton. Lyster, supra note 79, at 16. Damages
are significantly higher (proportionally) in developing countries where
pollution controls are significantly weaker or non-existent. See INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, supra note 90, at 319–20 (discussing health problems caused by air
pollution, and comparing air pollution levels of OECD and non-OECD
countries).
100. Global energy demand is expected to increase by over one-third by
2035, with much of the increase attributable to non-OECD countries (such as
China, India, and the Middle East). See IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
Additionally, an investment of $37 trillion in our energy supply system would
be necessary to meet increasing energy demands. Id.
101. Journalist and commentator Tom Friedman refers to the antidemocratic influence of oil economics in Middle Eastern countries as “the First
Law of Petropolitics.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY
WE NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION—AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA 112–13
(2008) (“As the price of oil goes up, the pace of freedom goes down; and as the
price of oil goes down, the pace of freedom goes up.”); see also Goldthau &
Sovacool, supra note 98, at 233 (“The world’s known oil reserves are
concentrated in a handful of largely volatile countries . . . whose governments
have been known to yield to the temptation to use their control of this vital
resource for political ends.”).
102. E.g., Jeremy Woods et al., Energy and the Food System, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2991, 3003–05 (2010)
(highlighting the potential negative impacts of energy prices on agricultural
outputs in discussing the relationship of fossil fuel markets, climate change,
and agricultural processes).
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already suffering from inadequate water supply,103 and the
energy poverty associated with the 1.6 billion people who lack
even basic access to electricity.104 These issue linkages
highlight that energy policy does not operate in a vacuum in
which only the carbon emissions are important. Existing
energy policy has major negative externalities throughout the
globe. At a minimum, they must be considered in energy policy
reform. The potential to improve local, national, or regional
conditions as part of an energy reform effort may also provide
helpful political and economic incentives for efforts to reduce or
replace fossil fuel dependence in a given geographic area or
economic and policy sector.
3. Energy and Geopolitical Power
While social and environmental externalities of the energy
status quo might provide leverage for reform, the potential for
energy reform to implicate for states’ core security and power
concerns may prove to be one of the toughest challenges facing
efforts to restructure global energy policy.105 As one scholar
describes it, “energy governance represents a contested domain
between power-based geopolitical concerns and multilateral
and cooperative governance.”106 Geopolitical policy analyst and
scholar Joseph Nye describes oil as “the most important raw
material in the world”107 and highlights the complex set of
forces from which the existing geopolitical situation emerged,
including the independence of former colonies, the Iranian
Revolution, an inadvertent transfer of technology from

103. See, e.g., IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 6 (predicting that energy
use in the future will see a rise in water consumption by eighty-five percent);
PARRY ET AL., supra note 43, at 11–16 (discussing the implications climate
change will have on freshwater resources, how they are managed, and how
various parts of the world will be affected).
104. LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 2.
105. Kirsten Westphal, Energy Policy Between Multilateral Governance
and
Geopolitics:
Whither
Europe?,
INTERNATIONALE POLITIK &
GESELLSCHAFT, no. 4, 2006 at 44, 52 (stating that energy security and the
energy sector as a whole remain vital for both a country’s national economy
and security).
106. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Ann Florini, Examining the Complications of
Global Energy Governance, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 235, 256
(2012) (citing Westphal, supra note 105, at 45).
107. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER 64 (2011).
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multinational corporations to oil-rich developing countries,108
and an implicit security-for-oil relationship between the world’s
most oil-rich nation and the world’s strongest military power.109
Thus, “oil is the exception, not the rule” when it comes to the
role of natural resources in global power relationships because
control of oil and its distribution have literally shaped key
global power relationships, rather than being determined by
pre-existing political power relationships.110 Reducing oil’s
dominance, therefore, would have massive geopolitical
implications—and potentially impose massive economic losses
on particular countries—with global power ramifications far
beyond anything yet precipitated by existing environmental
law.
4. International Energy Governance Challenges
The existing global energy governance structure is highly
decentralized and, at least arguably, incoherent.111 Unlike
environmental law, which is crowded with highly
institutionalized regimes confronting an array of global
environmental challenges,112 there is arguably no global energy
governance institution with the capacity to exercise global

108. The technology transfer referred to is of the type that Driesen and
Popp describe as “meaningful technology transfer,” in that it involved
enhancing the capacity and know-how of local economies within the countries
where multinational corporations operated. See David M. Driesen & David
Popp, Meaningful Technology Transfer for Climate Disruption, 64 J. INT’L AFF.
1, 5–8 (2010) (defining technology transfers and meaningful technology
transfers). The effect of this particular transfer was to shift political control of
oil in a way that was unrelated to GHG mitigation goals, but it may be that a
similar transfer of clean energy technology is required to realize climate
change mitigation goals. See NYE, supra note 107, at 65–66 (describing the
inadvertent technology transfer that occurred in oil-rich developing countries).
109. NYE, supra note 107, at 64–70. As Nye describes it, a system that was
once ruled by the “seven sisters”—an oligarchy of seven large transnational
corporations—is now governed by a delicate political balance centering on
Saudi Arabia, the United States, and several lesser players. Id. at 64–66.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (positing that energy
governance “incoherence is . . . amplified at the international level, where
authority is fragmented and often altogether lacking”).
112. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 4, at 484, 486–90 (examining the present
state of environmental law and the variety of challenges environmental law
regimes address).
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leadership authority on any subset of energy issues.113 Instead,
there is an unwieldy assortment of institutions (one recent nonexhaustive survey compiled fifty institutions that serve as
“global energy governors”) with a wide array of mandates,
geographic authority, and policy competencies.114 Thus,
although global energy policy reaches the heart of many of the
core challenges of the twenty-first century—security,
development, and the environment—governance of the system
has evolved primarily into a set of decentralized, mostly
unconnected, and primarily political (as opposed to legal)
institutions with limited impact.115 There are, in other words,
no clear lines of authority in energy governance and no
significant indications that an effective sector-wide governance
system will develop.
Some observers suggest that the governance institution
that may offer the brightest hope for actually improving global
energy policy is the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA), an institution with no binding authority and
relatively small financial capacity that seeks primarily to
promote renewable energy development through informationbased strategies and capacity building in least developed

113. See LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 72 (“As regards leadership in
global energy governance, the world’s cockpit is still more or less empty.”);
Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (discussing the incoherence and
fragmentation of global energy governors and describing our current
governance model as “full of sound and fury, yet . . . far too little substance”).
114. Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 239 tbl.2 (providing a table
summarizing fifty “global energy governors”); see also Timothy Meyer, The
Architecture of International Energy Governance, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
389, 390 (2012) (“An alphabet soup of international agreements and
organizations deals in some way or another with international energy . . . .”).
One can divide some of the major institutions in energy governance into
producer versus consumer clubs, or into economic institutions and
environmental institutions (primarily the UNFCCC), depending on how one
looks at the field. Id. at 391.
115. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 14, at 57 (concluding that “the
conventional framework is failing”); Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252
(emphasizing the disconnect between global energy governance institutions).
For example, a recent in-depth study of global energy governance explored
whether the G8’s apparent assumption of leadership in energy governance is a
sign that centralized energy governance is developing, but concluded that it
fails to provide a viable model for improving global energy governance. E.g.,
LESAGE ET AL., supra note 41, at 172–73 (concluding that the “G8 has
performed below expectations” and has displayed “serious shortcomings”).
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countries.116 At a time when multilateral environmental
regime-building efforts have slowed considerably, the creation
and rapidly growing membership of IRENA stands out.117
While it may signal a desire by some nations to counteract a
perceived fossil fuel bias in the IEA—the primary pre-existing
international energy institution—IRENA’s relative success in
advancing its renewables-promotion mission also suggests the
potential of non-legalistic (i.e., “soft” or non-binding)
approaches to international environmental governance to
influence behavior.118 Unlike the UNFCCC regime, IRENA’s
efforts to promote renewable energy are intentionally not
framed in terms of climate change or environmental benefit,
even though such concerns motivate much of the growth in
renewable energy technology that IRENA promotes.119 Thus,
perhaps IRENA illuminates the potential for making progress
on energy and climate challenges through adopting new
approaches, and perhaps the value of its story relates to the
need for rethinking existing perspectives on international
climate change and energy policy.
II. COMPLEXITY AND THE EMERGENCE
OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The various features of energy policy briefly described
above suggest the complex context of social, ecological, and
technological interactions that efforts to catalyze energy sector
changes must navigate if they are to produce climate change
mitigation.120 In this policy environment, identifying
interventions that will produce large-scale beneficial changes

116. See Johannes Urpelainen & Thijs Van de Graaf, The International
Renewable Energy Agency: A Success Story in Institutional Innovation?, INT’L
ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON., Sept. 2013, available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10784-013-9226-1.
117. IRENA was created months before the UNFCCC negotiations in
Copenhagen signaled the apparent end of hope for a new binding climate
agreement. In the next four years, over 100 countries ratified the agreement
creating this new, stand-alone institution. Thijs Van de Graaf, Fragmentation
in Global Energy Governance: Explaining the Creation of IRENA, 13 GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL. 14, 14 (2013).
118. Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, supra note 116, at *10.
119. Id.
120. Cf. Handke & Hey, supra note 9, at 2 (“[C]limate measures must
dovetail with energy policy and regulation of the energy sector if they are to
have any effect.”).
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requires strategies very different from the top-down UNFCCC
process, a point illustrated by IRENA’s relatively successful
start.121 Complex systems theory (or “complexity theory”) offers
one way in which we might begin to understand the mitigation
challenge differently and develop more effective policy
interventions.
In 1997, coincidentally the same year that the Kyoto
Protocol was signed, J.B. Ruhl warned that “[u]nless
environmental law sheds its traditional premises and methods,
the findings of complexity theory suggest we will not achieve
the kind of environmental law system needed to confront our
changing future.”122 The recently developed concepts of the
“anthropocene” and an Earth system in a “no analogue state”
express an exceptional degree of human impact on the planet’s
environmental systems123 that gives definition to the “changing
future” referenced in Ruhl’s 1997 warning.124 Facing these

121. See Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, supra note 116, at *12.
122. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941.
123. A number of scientists and others have come to highlight the
unprecedented nature of human impacts on the earth’s environmental
systems by describing the current era of time as the “Anthropocene.”
Atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen (a Nobel laureate) and ecologist Eugene
Stoermer coined the term in 2000. See Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer,
The “Anthropocene”, GLOBAL CHANGE NEWSL. (Int’l Geosphere-Biosphere
Programme, Stockholm, Swed.), May 2000, at 17, 17–18, available at
http://www.igbp.net/download/18.316f18321323470177580001401/1316517410
973/NL41.pdf. The globally-recognized organization that describes geological
periods is The International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS). Although we
are still officially in the Holocene, according to IUGS, the organization has
begun a working group to consider the concept of the Anthropocene.
Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, Working Group on the
COMMISSION
ON
STRATIGRAPHY,
http://
‘Anthropocene’,
INT’L
quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/ (last updated Aug.
1, 2013). The concept of a “no analogue” state expresses the idea that
environmental systems have been so intensely impacted by human-caused
forces that past empirical records are not reliably helpful to predicting
outcomes. E.g., Arild Underdal, Complexity and Challenges of Long-Term
Environmental Governance, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 386, 388 (2010). The
“no analogue” concept has particular relevance in ecology and species
conservation. E.g., Diana Stralberg et al., Re-shuffling of Species with Climate
Disruption: A No-Analog Future for California Birds?, PLOS ONE, Sept. 2009,
at 1, 5, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action;
jsessionid=E47834D0CCB2481E2BD368CCBCAAE227?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10
.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006825&representation=PDF (“The likely emergence
of novel, no-analog communities over the coming decades presents enormous
conservation and management challenges.”).
124. See Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941.

2014]

COMPLEXITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

1083

complex problems requires evolution in the approaches of law
and governance.125
Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol and its failure to catalyze
effective climate governance now seem to support Ruhl’s
conclusion.126 The emphasis on a legalistic and top-down treaty
structure to address climate change—the overarching goal of
UNFCCC negotiations for nearly twenty years and expressed
most clearly in the Kyoto Protocol and its quantifiable
emissions reduction commitments127—reflected on the
international level the core problem with domestic
environmental law that led Ruhl to call for “a truly radical
transformation of environmental law.”128 The core argument
expressed by Ruhl and an increasing number of other
environmental law scholars is that most of environmental law
reflects a “reductionist, linear, predictivist mentality” and
associated governance approach that fits poorly with the
complex environmental systems that they regulate.129 Building

125. E.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental
Law: Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
771, 798 (2011) (suggesting that the complexity of environmental problems led
to evolutionary changes in U.S. environmental regulation).
126. See Boyd, supra note 14, at 548–50 (discussing the Kyoto Protocol’s
top-down, global approach, its failure to implement effective climate
governance, and the need for a complex system to address climate change).
127. See id. at 548 (explaining that “the conviction that there can and
should be a blueprint for comprehensive climate governance, manifest most
prominently in the Kyoto architecture and in the efforts to negotiate a
successor treaty” led to many of the disappointments and failures of the
climate regime).
128. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941–42. Although most of his
analysis focuses on domestic environmental law, Ruhl suggests that the
transformation of environmental law should embrace an overall goal of global
sustainable development, with decision-making processes based upon adaptive
management principles, and the use of biodiversity preservation as a
performance metric. Id. at 942. It is impossible to know what the international
climate change regime would look like today if it had embraced Ruhl’s
suggestions, of course, but the focus on a top-down treaty with quantifiable
emissions reductions as the primary goal seems about as contrary to those
suggestions as anything in U.S. domestic environmental law.
129. Id. at 940 (characterizing environmental law as “mired in a
reductionist, linear, predictivist mentality”); see also Robin Kundis Craig,
Learning to Think About Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental
and Natural Resource Law and Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year
Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (2013) (“While scholars
may accept the new realities of complexity theory, much of environmental and
natural resources law remain based in paradigms of complicatedness,
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on that critique of environmental law, Parts III and IV of this
Article suggest that mitigation efforts may be improved by
applying a similar analysis to the overlapping social, ecological,
and technical systems affecting global energy policy, which can
be accurately conceptualized as a single large complex system
(“the global energy system”) that is the core subject of climate
change mitigation regulation.
Complex systems theory offers a perspective and a mode of
analysis that is radically different than many of the
assumptions underlying the law generally and environmental
law in particular. The most familiar manifestation of this
arises in debate over the need for flexibility in the face of
uncertainty, contrasted with the value of certainty and finality
in legal rules and legally significant decisions.130 A further
exposition of complexity theory concepts may elucidate the
value of rethinking pre-existing legal approaches to complex
issues such as climate change.
Complexity theory originated in the physical sciences in
the early to middle twentieth century and, with some
modification, became particularly important in ecological
science by the 1990s.131 By the dawn of the twenty-first
century, the concept of “socio-ecological systems” (SESs) had
developed as a useful way of understanding the interactions of
human social systems with natural environmental systems.
The majority of literature on SESs examines relatively small
scales, such as forest or wetland ecosystems.132 However, there
predictability, and stationarity—always a bad fit to ecological reality, and an
increasingly problematic mismatch in a climate change era.”).
130. One interesting example highlighting the challenges of this tension
was the attempt to transform forest management under the George W. Bush
administration, which adopted the language of adaptive management—long
called for by environmentalists—in an attempt to remove the firm regulatory
requirements that limit logging in national forests. Andrew Long, Auditing for
Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of Science, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 5 (2006).
131. See Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 9, at 857 n.9.
132. See, e.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 948–49 (using the example
of a single tree as a complex-adaptive system); cf. Ahjond S. Garmestani et al.,
Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building
Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (2009) (“Scale is the critical variable in
monitoring and therefore policy associated with linked socio-ecological
systems. Cumulative impacts have the capacity to ‘scale up’ in terms of their
effect. As an illustration, large scale destruction and degradation of wetlands,
and the ecological services associated with those wetlands, has occurred
primarily as a result of innumerable, small conversions of wetlands for
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is also a growing body of work that examines the relevance of
the SES perspective for global-scale change.133 In 2002, Lance
Gunderson and C.S. Holling published an edited volume
articulating a theory of “panarchy” as an “integrative theory to
help us understand the changes occurring globally,” which are
“economic, ecological, social, and evolutionary.”134 Panarchy
theory illustrates, among other things, the multiscale and
overlapping nature of SESs.135
Beginning with Ruhl’s work in the 1990s, a number of
environmental law scholars have explored how complexitybased theories may be valuable to environmental law, although
significant analytical work remains to clarify its implications
for governance, and few of these theoretical explorations have
been tested through policy implementation, especially at large
scales.136 Indeed, scholars who have written extensively on the
importance of incorporating the insights of complexity theories
note explicitly that it is a difficult task for which we have very
limited guidance.137 Yet complexity theory can provide an

agricultural and urban development—a tyranny of many small decisions.”
(footnote omitted)).
133. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 14, at 478–79 (discussing the use of these
models to simulate “the oceans, the cryosphere, the biosphere, and human
activities”).
134. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a
UNDERSTANDING
Theory
of
Adaptive
Change,
in
PANARCHY:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 3, 5 (Lance H.
Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
135. Garmestani et al., supra note 132, at 1037 (“Unlike the top-down
control envisioned in traditional hierarchies, connectivity between adaptive
cycles in a panarchy can be from levels above or below. In a hierarchy, lowerlevel patterns and processes are dominated by higher levels in the hierarchy.
Panarchy differs from this characterization of nesting, with respect to complex
systems, in that conditions can arise that trigger ‘bottom-up’ (i.e., cross-scale
cascading) change in the system. This model of socio-ecological systems more
accurately captures the ‘surprise’ or uncertainty inherent in such systems.
Further, levels in a panarchy are not static states, but rather adaptive cycles
that are interconnected to other adaptive cycles in the panarchy.”).
136. Andreas Duit et al., Governance, Complexity, and Resilience, 20
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 363, 365–67 (2010); see also Craig, supra note 129, at
102 (“Complexity theory and resilience thinking offer the brightest hope for
the future of environmental and natural resources law and policy in this
climate change era, and so we should all hope that they continue to inspire
transformative scholarship.”).
137. E.g., J.B. Ruhl, Panarchy and the Law, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Sept. 2012,
at 2, 4, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss3/art31/ES2012-5109.pdf (observing that “translating and operationalizing panarchy
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alternative way of examining large social systems and their
interaction with natural systems in order to yield policy
insights that better account for the uncertainty often found in
environmental challenges, as well as the uncertainties of the
political and social systems within which law is created to
address these challenges.138
Complex systems are not merely “complicated” systems,
which involve many independent variables.139 Complex systems
are systems in which the components exhibit dependencies
such that the system as a whole has properties that “emerge”
and cannot be explained as the sum of the constituent parts.140
Further, these systems demonstrate nonlinearity, meaning
that
they
cannot
be
predicted
with
proportional
mathematics.141 In applications that are most relevant to
environmental law, a key feature of nonlinearity is its
unpredictability, which is related to complex systems’ selforganizing characteristics and the potential for small
perturbations in the system to produce large and even
transformational changes.142 This latter potential reflects the
extreme sensitivity of complex systems in their current or
starting states, as well as path dependency dynamics.143 It also
theory into law will be a very difficult undertaking,” but nonetheless warning
that lawyers should “not underestimate the need to make that move”).
138. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory
and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 172–73 (2003);
Ruhl, supra note 131, at 892–93, 905, 913. For a creative and well-developed
example of using complexity theory concepts to reimagine a complex
environmental issue area, see Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity
Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495, 502
(2004) (taking the unique approach of describing environmental law as an
“information platform”).
139. Craig, supra note 129, at 88 (“Complexity scientists generally
distinguish complex systems from complicated systems.”).
140. See JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 121–22
(1998) (discussing the limitations of only looking at the “average” behavior of
each part of a complex system); see also Craig, supra note 129, at 88–91
(listing several distinguishing properties of complex systems).
141. Ruhl, supra note 131, at 854 (“[T]he interaction of law and society can
be modeled using the characteristics of dissipative, nonlinear dynamical
systems; that is, when conceived as a unified system, the interaction of law
and society evolves in an unfolding nonreversible manner that is not based on
components with directly proportional relationships capable of being graphed
as a straight line.” (footnote omitted)).
142. See id. at 875–80 (discussing chaos and its impact on complexity
theory).
143. Id.
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reflects the impossibility of fully calculating the effects of an
intervention affecting even small components of any system in
which the components are interdependent. Any change to one
component will cause changes to the others, which then cause a
new set of changes to occur, and so on in a dynamic and
continual process that constitutes the trajectory of the
system.144 In relatively rare instances, very minor (even
immeasurable) changes to a small component can produce
extremely large consequences for the system as a whole,145 but
more often, systemic change is a process of accretion and
reaction over time and may be understandable, but not fully
predictable.146
Key concepts related to change in complex systems are
frequently discussed in terms of “resilience,” “adaptability,” and
“transformation.”147 The use of these terms is not consistent
throughout all types of complex systems literature, nor is it
entirely consistent within subsets of the literature.148
Nonetheless, each of the terms has meaning across systems
contexts. In the “resilience thinking” literature, which is among
the strands of complexity theory that has exerted the most
influence on recent environmental law scholarship,149
“resilience” is defined as the capacity of a socio-ecological
system to change yet remain within the thresholds that define

144. See David G. Post & David R. Johnson, “Chaos Prevailing on Every
Continent”: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in
Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1060–73 (1998) (providing an
exceptionally clear discussion of this concept by use of a garden metaphor).
145. This extreme situation is an example of “power laws,” which are not
common even in systems, but provide a very clear illustration of how different
systems operations can be from traditional probability and common
expectations of cause and effect. Farber, supra note 138, at 153–54.
146. Id. at 153.
147. Cf. Carl Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience,
Adaptability and Transformability, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, Dec. 2010, at 20, 20,
available
at
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20/ES-20103610.pdf (describing resilience, adaptability, and transformability as three
central aspects of complex systems). Folke et al. use the term
“transformability” to express an element of the concept discussed here and
elsewhere as “transformation.” Id.
148. See id. at 20, 22 (noting “confusion” that results from publications
using these terms in multiple ways; additionally, the author provides a
glossary to clarify the definition of key terms).
149. See Robin K. Craig & Melinda H. Benson, Replacing Sustainability, 46
AKRON L. REV. 841, 868 (2013).
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its trajectory.150 Although several possible “system states” may
exist inside the thresholds within which a resilient system
tends to remain, systems are resilient when they respond to
external or internal forces through change (perhaps even to
other system states within the thresholds) without being
pushed into a fundamentally different trajectory or
fundamentally new system.151 “Adaptability” is the system’s
ability to respond to such forces—its ability to change―which
underlies its resilience because such responsive changes allow
the system to avoid being fundamentally altered by the forces
affecting it.152 On the other hand, “transformation” refers to a
fundamental reorganization of a system into a new system with
a different trajectory.153 This occurs when forces exceed the
adaptive capacity of the system and thus overwhelm its ability
to maintain resilience.154
Other formulations of the transformation concept are also
important to note, however, and generally refer to less radical
changes. Thus, transformation can be understood as a change
in the system state (without necessarily exceeding fundamental
limits), as exemplified by changing a pasture managed for
raising sheep to one that is managed for goats.155 The concept
of “resilience” warrants some additional attention because not
only has it been used to express different concepts, but also
because at least two different types of resilience have been
150. Folke et al., supra note 147, at 21; see C.S. Holling, Resilience and
Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 1 (1973)
(introducing the concept of resilience).
151. See Craig & Benson, supra note 149, at 863 (describing system states
in the context of resilience theory). One relevant application of this concept at
a global scale is the idea that variations between ice and non-ice ages within
the Holocene represent changes in the system state of the planet, but not a
fundamental transformation, and that the Anthropocene concept expresses
the potential for fundamental transformation of these systems. See Will
Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary
Stewardship, 40 AMBIO 739, 755–56 (2011).
152. Folke et al., supra note 147, at 21 (“Adaptability captures the capacity
of a SES to learn, combine experience and knowledge, adjust its responses to
changing external drivers and internal processes, and continue developing
within the current stability domain or basin of attraction.” (citation omitted)).
153. Id. at 22–23.
154. See id.
155. Brian Walker et al., A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositions
for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y,
June 2006, at 13, 21, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol11/iss1/art13/.
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widely recognized. The definition suggested above reflects
“ecological resilience,” which refers to “resistance” or the ability
to absorb disturbance without fundamental alteration of the
system.156 The concept of “engineering resilience,” however, is
distinct and refers to the ability to “recover” or return to a
“steady state” of equilibrium.157
Complex systems theory focuses on the interactions among
components of a system, whether the system is ecological,
social, or another type (including socio-ecological and sociotechnical).158 The theory tends to highlight the potential for
relatively small-scale adjustments to a component or an
interaction of components to create a ripple effect that can
ultimately lead to large-scale changes of the system as a
whole.159 This reflects the overlapping and nested nature of
many systems.160 For example, smaller scale systems may
undergo transformation in ways that serve to enhance the
adaptability and resilience of larger-scale systems in response
to significant forces driving change.161 The state of the system
at one point in time generally defines the potential pathways
through which changes may take effect and reverberate,
although these can be very difficult or impossible to identify, let
alone predict, because of the extremely high number of
potential interactions and configurations within complex
systems.162 In this way, complex systems theory accounts for
the uncertainty and unpredictability of complex systems and
offers an explanation, although not one that offers concrete and

156. J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive
Capacity in Legal Systems: With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77 (2011) (discussing the differences between
ecological and engineering resilience concepts).
157. Id. at 1377 (describing the effect on the movement of a ball at the
bottom of a tall, narrow vase (a metaphor for engineering resilience) compared
to the effect on the movement of a ball in a wide but shallower bowl (a
metaphor for ecological resilience) to illustrate the difference between the
types of resilience).
158. See C.S. Holling, Understanding the Complexity of Economic,
Ecological, and Social Systems, 4 ECOSYSTEMS 390, 390 (2001).
159. See Folke et al., supra note 147, at 20–21.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 24.
162. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 129, at 92 (“One of the important lessons
for environmental and natural resources law from complexity science is that
uncertainty and unpredictability are inherent limitations on the legal system’s
ability to perfectly control and regulate its subjects . . . .”).
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specific predictions, of how and why alterations to the
components of a system can produce change effects ranging
from nearly imperceptible to transformation of the system as a
whole.163 Although this type of nonlinear process is not fully
predictable, it may create opportunities to adjust components of
a system in order to initiate a sequence of interactions that
produce large-scale changes in trajectory, even where direct
system-wide change would be practically impossible. When
complexity analysis is applied to socio-ecological systems, it
generally results in policy insights that are very different from
the traditional (linear and reductionist, in most cases)
approach to an issue.164 Climate change mitigation is no
different from many other issues in this respect.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE MITIGATION
CHALLENGE AS A COMPLEX SYSTEMS PROBLEM
Over the last fifteen to twenty years, environmental
scholars began to recognize the value of complex systems
theory for environmental policy analysis and design.165
Somewhat ironically, this approach has gained the most
traction in the context of climate change adaptation, but has
received almost no attention in the context of climate change
mitigation governance.166 Yet, the high level of global GHG
emissions, particularly since the middle of the twentieth
century, can easily be understood as an emergent property of a

163. See id. at 88–89, 102 (defining complex systems and advocating the
use of complexity theory). See generally Farber, supra note 138, at 172–73
(arguing that power laws―where the possibility of a freak outcome weighs
heavily in the analysis—apply to environmental issues, and that complexity
theory can help explain such freak outcomes and suggest possible ways to
handle them).
164. Among the first articles to make this point in legal scholarship was
Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 9; see also Craig, supra note 129, at 91–
93 (proposing the application of complexity science to transform
environmental law to a dynamic governance system capable of adapting to
change and uncertainty with reference to socio-ecological systems).
165. See Craig, supra note 129, at 100–01 (“Are we to the point where the
complexity of ecosystems and socio-ecological systems is accepted as a given by
environmental and natural resources law scholars? Probably.”).
166. Cf. Outka, supra note 4, at 1684–86 (discussing the complexity of the
legal system and climate change as barriers to effective climate change
regulation).
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global energy system.167 This Part begins to explore whether
examining the mitigation challenge as a complex systems
problem, by conceiving of fossil energy dominance and related
GHG emissions as undesirable emergent properties of a
complex “global energy system,” can provide useful policy
insights.
If energy policy can accurately be understood as a complex
global energy system, policy analysis may be made more
fruitful by accounting for the complex systems properties it
possesses.168 Attention to the dynamic and nonlinear processes
of complex systems, sensitivity to system state and path
dependency, and the potential for relatively small alterations to
provoke the emergence of major systemic state changes at a
very large scale provide ways of thinking about the global
energy system that are likely to yield policy recommendations
very different from the incremental and legalistic efforts that
have characterized most of environmental law, in the United
States and internationally, and which have repeatedly failed to
produce significant climate change mitigation.169
It would be hard to imagine a global system that is less
likely than the global energy system to respond to the types of
reductionist processes and methods that have come to
characterize nearly all of environmental law at both domestic
and international levels.170 Thus, if global energy governance
holds out hope for climate change mitigation—and with the
167. See, e.g., Felder, supra note 9, at 89 (describing the global energy
system as “a complex, large-scale, integrated, open, and socio-technical
(CLIOS) system”); see also JOSEPH M. SUSSMAN, THE “CLIOS PROCESS:” A
USER’S GUIDE (2007), available at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/engineeringsystems-division/esd-04j-frameworks-and-models-in-engineering-systemsengineering-system-design-spring-2007/readings/clios_process.pdf (discussing
the CLIOS systems, which is a concept that grows from engineering
literature).
168. See Felder, supra note 9, at 105.
169. See id. at 104–05.
170. Id. at 93 (“Coincident with the needs of policymakers to reevaluate
global climate change mitigation policy, the importance of a multi-disciplinary
approach to solving intractable social problems has long been recognized.
These problems consist of intertwined technological and social complexities
that cannot be adequately addressed by a reductionist scientific approach.”
(footnote omitted)); see Goldthau & Sovacool, supra note 98, at 232 (“As we
shall argue in this article, energy is, among all policy fields exhibiting
externalities of a global scale, by far the most complex, path dependent, and
embedded one.”); see also Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252–56
(discussing the challenges of energy governance).
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near collapse of UNFCCC process focused primarily on
traditional environmental law approaches, it may be the only
hope—proposals need to account for the extremely messy
governance structure and the multiple layers of social and
economic issues that characterize energy policy.171 More
importantly, to be effective, such proposals should account for
the interaction of the diverse and diffuse components of energy
policy. It is the interactions of these components that are most
relevant to demonstrate the existence of a complex global
energy system because it is through this interaction that the
system produces emergent properties.172 Chief among the
emergent properties is the dominance of fossil-fuel-based
technologies.173 The longstanding dominance of these
technologies is an example of what technology literature often
describes as technological “lock-in,” but which will be more
familiar to environmental law scholars as a form of
resilience.174 One way of thinking about climate change, then,
171. See, e.g., Carlarne, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasizing the need to move
on from our current global climate governance system and pursue “a web of
multi-level, multi-scale systems” to accommodate the complex economic,
social, and political issues presented by climate change); Sovacool & Florini,
supra note 106, at 260–63 (discussing potentially promising approaches to
reforming global energy governance).
172. See, e.g., Sovacool & Florini, supra note 106, at 252 (listing examples
of the “disparate topics” that global energy regulators are tasked with
addressing); see also Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and
Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 920 (2005) (“When mechanisms of selfassembly lead to properties of a system that are not shared by its constituent
parts, these properties are called emergent.”).
173. See Davies, supra note 4, at 481 (“Energy regulation in the United
States clearly ‘favors large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive,
integrated, and centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels.’” (quoting
Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 355, 375 (1990))); see also IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1
(stating that fossil fuels accounted for 81% of the global energy supply in
2012).
174. See Duit et al., supra note 136, at 365–67 (applying the concept of
resilience to governance issues). See generally Sovacool, supra note 76, at
4504–12 (examining the economic, political, and behavioral impediments of
implementing renewable energy systems which in turn support the continued
dominance of fossil fuels). One may fairly question whether the resilience of
the global energy system in a state of fossil fuel dominance is ecological
resilience or engineering resilience. Arguably, events such as the 1970s oil
crisis suggest that the system tends to “bounce back” rather than absorb
shocks and, thus, can be understood as exhibiting engineering resilience
rather than ecological resilience. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying
text.
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is to view fossil fuel dominance as a particularly important
emergent property of the global energy system, one which has
become so dominant that it threatens the stability of other
systems interacting with the energy system—most notably, the
climate system.
A. THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM
In his 1997 article calling for a transformation of
environmental law, J.B. Ruhl encouraged creation of an
environmental law system that enables “complex adaptive
system forces to take hold and flourish,”175 a theme which has
been echoed with increasing frequency in recent years. Of
course, basing a regulatory strategy on complex-systems forces
presupposes that one is working with a complex system. So,
how does one determine whether a large-scale system such as
the global energy system is indeed a complex system? In
assessing the objects of environmental regulation, Ruhl
identifies the following general properties of complex adaptive
systems: aggregation, nonlinearity, flows, diversity, and selfcriticality.176 In discussing complexity theory as a descriptive
tool for administrative law, Donald Hornstein identifies
emergence from self-assembly, sensitivity to initial conditions,
and nonlinearity as indicative of a complex system.177 In a
recent article analyzing international environmental law as a
complex adaptive system, the authors point to related processes
of nonlinearity, emergence, and self-organization.178 One could
also examine the literature from other disciplines, particularly
literature which explores differences between natural and
human systems in terms of complexity and adaptive

175. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 942; see also id. at 941–42
(suggesting that the transformation should embrace an overall goal of global
sustainable development, with decision-making processes based upon adaptive
management principles, and the use of biodiversity preservation as a
performance metric).
176. Id. at 943–53. See generally J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory
to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of
Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997) (discussing similar
properties of complex adaptive systems).
177. Hornstein, supra note 172, at 913, 916.
178. Rakhyun E. Kim & Brendan Mackey, International Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System, 14 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 5, 7–8
(2014).
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characteristics,179 which may have value in future efforts to
define precise reform actions aimed at mitigating climate
change through the global energy system. It is also important
to recognize that complexity theory includes concepts related to
the “attractors” of systems.180 Attractors can be “strange” and
complex, but can also be more stable, fixed or cyclical, and some
mix of these attractors is at play in most systems, leading to
their adaptability on what has been called the “edge of
chaos.”181 For present purposes, however, a general recognition
of complex systems properties is sufficient to illustrate that the
global energy system acts as a complex system. Thus, I suggest
that the global energy system can be understood as a complex
system through two clusters of related characteristics: (1) selforganization and emergence, reflecting what Ruhl describes as
“aggregation;”182 and (2) nonlinearity through flows based on a
sensitivity to initial conditions, reflecting both the concept of
path dependency and the potential for small changes to effect
large systemic effects that may, on relatively rare occasions,
even lead to fundamental transformation of the system (such
transformation is often referred to as “catastrophe”).183
Moreover, the multiscalar and overlapping legal, sectoral, and
physical systems composing the global energy system illustrate
that it has characteristics of a panarchy.184 Many of these
features are illustrated in the discussion above, but are made
somewhat more explicit through a brief analysis below.

179. See, e.g., Holling, supra note 158, at 401 (stating that human systems
exhibit three unique features: “foresight, communication, and technology”).
180. See Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 419 n.27 (“An attractor is simply
a model representation of the potential long term behavior of the system, a
useful concept for exploring different kinds of long-term behavior. The
attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system,
but simply depicts where the system is headed based on the rules of motion in
the system.” (citation omitted)).
181. See id. at 418–23.
182. Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 945.
183. See, e.g., Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 421 (“This is known as
catastrophe behavior.”).
184. See Ruhl, supra note 156, at 1383 (“Resilience theory does not posit
that a system as complex as law is entirely either a vase or a saucer; rather, it
is more a set of landscapes over which we find engineering and ecological
resilience strategies mixing in different blends to form topographies of various
contours depending on where in the system we look. Some resilience theorists
refer to this multiscalar complex of topographies as a ‘panarchy.’” (footnote
omitted)).
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The global energy system exhibits self-organization and
emergence, meaning that through interactions of its
components, the system itself produces properties that cannot
be explained through analysis of individual components or as
the imposition of an external actor.185 This type of behavior is
apparent in many features of the global energy system,
including the market structure that leads to pricing and price
fluctuation but also in more fundamental aspects such as the
dominance of fossil fuels throughout the system.186 The role of
interaction in creating emergent properties is apparent in
several features of energy policy highlighted in Part I, supra.
The following two processes that created and reinforce fossil
fuel dominance in global energy policy suggest an interactive
process: (1) the tightly coupled national political and financial
reinforcement of fossil fuel dominance, to the point that
hundreds of billions of dollars in annual subsidies support
fossil fuel dominance; and (2) control of these resources has
exhibited an undeniable influence on the shape of overarching
global political power relationships (including, but not limited
to, empowering oil-rich nations) in ways that were
unpredictable, leading to strong international political
reinforcement of fossil fuel use and expansion, thus acting to
preserve their dominance of fossil fuel energy throughout the
globe.187
In addition, the global energy system reached its current
state through a long series of events that bear the mark of
nonlinearity and which provoke changes through flows,
primarily of oil and money.188 The technology of the global
energy system, for example, includes some of the most
surprising and important inventions and discoveries dating
back to the Industrial Revolution.189 From before the
development of electricity through well after the price shocks of
the 1970s, the history of the global energy system is
punctuated with events that resulted from a confluence of
circumstances and created significant leaps forward in the
potential for society to meet its material needs and desires,
185. See, e.g., Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 7–8.
186. See id.; supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part I.D. These examples are meant to illustrate the type of
processes at play, not to provide an exhaustive survey.
188. See, e.g., Sovacool, supra note 76, at 4506–09.
189. See Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 9.
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which then established a new technological status quo that
established the parameters of potential future social and
technological paths.190 Although tracing the threads that have
shaped the current system is beyond the scope of this Article, it
is notable that features of the energy system are often cited as
examples of nonlinear systems behavior.191
Although the core premise of this Article requires
understanding the global energy system as a complex system,
this Article does not take a position on whether it is useful to
think of the global energy system as a complex adaptive
system. There is room for argument about what, specifically,
makes a complex system adaptive.192 Certainly, the resilience
of the system and its apparent balance between order and
chaos suggest adaptive qualities.193 However, other hallmarks
of adaptability, such as diversity, which Ruhl describes as “the
signature of complex adaptive systems,”194 may be lacking in
the global energy system. Indeed, one could argue that it is the
lack of diversity represented by the dominance of fossil fuel
technologies that prompts the desire to catalyze transformation
of the system away from its current state. Thus, to some extent,
the degree to which the global energy system is viewed as
adaptable may depend on the way in which one defines the
system. Viewed narrowly, in terms of the path upon which it
has thus far developed, one might wish to emphasize the nonadaptive characteristics of the system because it is precisely
those features that should be targeted in transformation efforts
(a theme often repeated in the socio-technical literature
discussed below). However, viewed broadly, in terms of the
system’s ability to support social goals and meet human needs,
one can understand the system’s potential for adaptation as a

190. Cf. Schipper, supra note 13, at 87 tbl.1 (summarizing the “historical
framing of climate change debate and adaptation thinking” from the 1960s
onward).
191. E.g., Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 444–45 (discussing the
apparently random events, including discovery of oil in Texas and the
resulting low cost of gasoline, leading to the rise of the automobile in the early
twentieth century). See generally Felder, supra note 9 (analyzing the global
energy system as a complex system in greater detail).
192. E.g., Kim & Mackey, supra note 178, at 8 (“[Complex adaptive
systems] are special cases of complex systems, although the line between them
and complex systems is not clear.”).
193. See Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 947.
194. Id. at 948–49.
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prerequisite to advocating for change. The goal of
transformation, after all, is not to destabilize the provision of
energy, but merely to change the current state of the system
through which such energy is produced and supplied.195 In this
sense, the goal of climate change mitigation efforts is to alter
the path upon which the system has, in a self-organizing way,
established itself, and to do so in a manner that averts the
types of devastating social consequences (such as those
discussed in models of extreme climate change or in predictions
of peak oil and subsequently dwindling supply) that appear
likely to force the system onto another path at some point in
the future in order to avoid collapse. In this sense, climate
change mitigation may be understood as an effort to speed a
process of change that is likely to occur anyway and, by doing
so, avoid the most severe consequences of the status quo.
B. THE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEM, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Most environmental law literature that considers
complexity theory focuses on its application to natural systems
with desirable characteristics, and, by extension, to a system of
law designed to promote environmental quality by preventing
undesirable transformation of environmental systems.196 Thus,
this literature generally discusses resilience and adaptation as
desirable qualities—things to be nurtured in environmental
systems and fostered in legal systems that aim to promote
environmental quality.197 While there is recognition that
undesirable characteristics or features of a system may be
resilient, this possibility is rarely discussed in any depth by
environmental law literature, especially as it relates to social
(rather than ecological) systems.198 However, attention to the
195. Cf. Folke, supra note 147, at 23 (“[T]ransformability has been defined
as ‘the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological,
economic, or social structures make the existing system untenable.’” (citation
omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 941–42.
197. E.g., Craig & Benson, supra note 149, at 844 (arguing that “resilience”
should replace “sustainability” as a policy goal of environmental law).
198. E.g., id. (noting the possibility of resilience in undesirable components
without discussing application of the concept of negative resilience to social
systems); see also Mary J. Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of
Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV. 950, 1000 (2009)
(observing that resilience of ecosystems in undesirable system states may
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resilience of undesirable features may have value to
environmental law at various scales. For example, at the
ecosystem scale it may prove useful for addressing issues such
as invasive species. It may also be valuable in understanding
undesirable characteristics of global social systems, such as the
dominance of fossil fuels in the global energy system and the
emergence of climate change. Of course, even high resilience
can give way, producing transformation. Although discussions
of resilience of undesirable system components rarely receive
attention in environmental law literature (and even in
ecologically oriented systems literature), another area of
literature based on complexity theory has transformation to
displace resilient undesirable system components as a primary
focus. This literature analyzes “socio-technical systems” by
drawing on a complex systems understanding of social forces
and technological forces.199
Benjamin Sovacool recently noted that “one of the most
salient characteristics of modern industrial systems such as
telephones and power networks is the degree to which they are
not salient for most people, most of the time.”200 For many
people, existing technological systems are taken as a given,
which obscures their contingent nature.201 Attention to the
socio-technical context of technology, including the interacting
social and technical sources of technological constraints, makes
explicit the processes and systemic forces that define current
require management actions to achieve more desirable states). But see Ruhl,
supra note 156, 1381–84 (discussing resilience in the context of the legal
system as normatively neutral, noting examples of resilience in undesirable
elements such as slavery, and observing that transformation is desirable in
some instances).
199. Cf. Stephen M. McCauley & Jennie C. Stephens, Green Energy
Clusters and Socio-technical Transitions: Analysis of a Sustainable Energy
Cluster for Regional Economic Development in Central Massachusetts, USA, 7
SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 213, 213–14 (2012) (“The transformation of complex
socio-technical systems, and particularly the shift from a fossil fuel-based
energy system to one reliant on renewable energy sources, involves a
significant re-shaping of regional, place-based infrastructures, economic
systems, and social practices.”). See generally THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS
OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880–1930 (1983)
(providing a background for establishing socio-technical theory).
200. Sovacool, supra note 76, at 4502 (citing Paul N. Edwards,
Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the
History of Sociotechnical Systems, in MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 185–226
(Thomas J. Misa et al. eds., 2003)).
201. See id. at 4502–03.
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limits and thereby draws attention to the horizon of
technological possibility.202 In environmental law discussions,
which often focus on risk and harm prevention, the significant
potential for law and policy to affect socio-technical systems in
ways that expand this horizon can easily be lost.
The goals of socio-technical systems research include not
only to understand the interaction of social and technological
systems as a general matter, but also to develop an operational
understanding of the relevant processes in order to enable
intentional transformation of highly resilient and undesirable
aspects of socio-technical systems.203 The dominance of fossil
fuel-based technologies in energy systems is among the
primary examples of a resilient undesirable characteristic of
socio-technical systems. As one article notes, socio-technical
literature often differs from SES literature in that “where
existing regimes are judged to be unsustainable, for instance,
in energy . . . socio-technical resilience is an undesirable
property,” and the goal of systemic analysis is to stimulate
“radical regime change.”204 Thus, in the language of systems
theory more generally, much socio-technical research aims to
identify potential pathways for transformation of systems with
highly resilient and highly undesirable properties.205
Conceptualizing fossil energy’s dominant place in the energy
system and the climate change resulting therefrom in this way
may provide a fresh perspective on the law and policy questions
confronting efforts to address climate change, suggesting that
law and policy scholars may draw value from greater attention
to socio-technical systems literature.
Most significantly, the concept of “negative resilience” and
conceptualizing mitigation as a goal related to transformation
of the energy system may prove crucial to developing more
effective governance intervention strategies to promote
mitigation. As the projections of the IEA and others suggest,

202. See id. at 4503.
203. Adrian Smith & Andy Stirling, The Politics of Social-Ecological
Resilience and Sustainable Socio-technical Transitions, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y,
Mar. 2010, at 11, 14, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol15/iss1/art11 (“The aim of socio-technical research is thus usually focused
on explaining and overcoming this negative resilience.” (citation omitted)).
204. Id.
205. See id; Walker et al., supra note 155, at 21 (“Transformation involves
changing the state space of the system and the scales of the panarchy.”).
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there is a very real risk that the dominance of fossil fuels in the
global energy system will become even more entrenched and
pronounced over the coming decades.206 As the preceding Parts
explained, there are social (including political and economic)
reasons for this, and these are reinforced by current
technological
limitations.
Thus,
a
context-sensitive
understanding of the obstacles facing legal and political
responses to climate change may be a prerequisite to designing
and implementing an effective legal and political mitigation
strategy. This strategy must also include attention to the sociotechnical system that is a part of the global SES in which
climate change has emerged as a severe threat. In other words,
greater attention to the process of technological change in
society will likely lead to more effective proposals for legal
reform.207
Although legal literature recognizes that the barriers to
technological change represent one of the fundamental
differences between the success of the Montreal Protocol and
the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, analyses of the issue rarely
dig beyond well-known considerations such as the role of
economic incentives and the potential for law to operate as a
technology forcing mechanism.208 The socio-technical literature
may thus provide an element—in-depth analysis of the
interaction between social forces and technical aspects of
technological change—that is both essential to addressing
climate change and vastly underrepresented in environmental
law literature. For example, fossil fuel-based electricity
generation presents a paradigmatic example of “strongly
embedded, self-reinforcing systems” and has received
significant attention in socio-technical research.209 Recent
socio-technical work examining the context for a renewable
energy transition in the United States includes an assessment
of barriers to renewable electricity210 and of the emergence of
206. E.g., IEA FACTSHEET, supra note 3, at 1 (predicting that fossil fuels
will remain the dominant source of energy through at least 2035).
207. Cf. Ruhl & Ruhl, supra note 176, at 444–52 (describing the use of
technological change as an analogous context for analyzing the law as a
complex system).
208. See generally Sunstein, supra note 76 (demonstrating that the
importance of technological considerations is apparent throughout the
literature that has compared the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol).
209. Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 13.
210. Sovacool, supra note 76.
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small-scale clusters of renewable power within communities.211
Similar research in the United Kingdom provides insights into
the role of public perception and reception in a shift from
centralized fossil energy and associated policy structures to
more
heterogeneous
and
diffuse
renewable
energy
alternatives.212 Work of this nature holds significant promise
for enabling law and policy scholars to better understand the
context in which an effective climate change response must
operate and, thus, may inform the development of both legal
analysis that better accounts for existing extra-legal
constraints and concrete policy proposals that have a greater
chance of achieving desired results.
The input of law and policy scholars may also prove to be a
welcome compliment to existing efforts of socio-technical
systems analysis. Much of the socio-technical literature
explores how multiscale technological change relates to
economic and other social forces without addressing key
questions of law and policy design necessary for applying such
insights in a way that can catalyze transformation of the
energy system.213 Indeed, some early work attempting to draw
on socio-technical theory to facilitate clean energy technology
was sharply criticized for relatively simplistic and mechanistic
treatment of governance processes.214 As the field has grown, it

211. McCauley & Stephens, supra note 199.
212. E.g., C. Nolden, The Governance of Innovation Diffusion—A Sociotechnical Analysis of Energy Policy, 33 EPJ WEB CONFERENCES, art. 01012, at
4–6 (2012), available at http://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/abs/
2012/15/epjconf_e2c2012_01012/epjconf_e2c2012_01012.html (evaluating the
United Kingdom’s focus in renewable energy such as offshore wind and solar
PV).
213. See Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 18–19 (discussing the
political (and, implicitly, legal) questions left open by socio-technical systems
literature relevant to sustainability and clean energy). See generally FRANK
W. GEELS, TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSITIONS AND SYSTEM INNOVATIONS: A COEVOLUTIONARY AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 103–245 (2005) (providing
complexity-based analysis of three major technological changes in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, along with general
conclusions).
214. E.g., Smith & Stirling, supra note 203, at 17 (“[C]ritical political
dynamics challenge straightforward managerial understandings of transition
management.” (citation omitted)); see also Audley Genus & Anne-Marie Coles,
Rethinking the Multi-level Perspective of Technological Transitions, 37 RES.
POL’Y 1436, 1444 (2008) (“An aspect of this is to consider how, the extent to
which, and in what circumstances state organisations and other interested or
affected actors affect the diffusion of technology through society.”).
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has come to provide not only insights into the barriers to
technological transition, but also increasingly well-developed
models of technological change215 and a range of relevant case
studies that may assist in understanding the conditions
through which transition to clean energy technology can
occur.216 Such models and case studies can be seen as offering
key information and analytical frameworks for understanding
the catalytic role that law can play in technological change on
multiple scales, even if much of the current literature lacks
sophisticated attention to legal and political analysis to inform
reform strategies. In some respects, the insights of sociotechnical literature hold a potential value for designing more
effective legal tools to achieve mitigation that is similar to what
SESs literature offers for adaptation. It may, therefore, offer a
particularly relevant and helpful source for environmental law
scholars seeking to understand alternatives to the failed
approach of the Kyoto Protocol and efforts toward
comprehensive U.S. climate change legislation.
IV. FROM COMPLEXITY THEORY TO EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ENERGY
SYSTEM FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
As others have recognized, incorporating concepts from
complex systems theory into law and governance presents a
significant challenge.217 The high level of abstraction common

215. E.g., Adrian Smith et al., The Governance of Sustainable Sociotechnical Transitions, 34 RES. POL’Y 1491, 1491–92 (2005) (developing a model
based on articulation of selection pressures and availability of resources that
create an adaptive capacity for regime transition).
216. E.g., Halina S. Brown & Philip J. Vergragt, Bounded Socio-technical
Experiments as Agents of Systemic Change: The Case of a Zero-Energy
Residential Building, 75 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 107,
127–28 (2008) (describing the use of small-scale projects to create social
receptivity to technological change); Daphne Ngar-yin Mah et al., Governing
the Transition of Socio-technical Systems: A Case Study of the Development of
Smart Grids in Korea, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 133 (2012); Jennie C. Stephens &
Scott Jiusto, Assessing Innovation in Emerging Energy Technologies: Sociotechnical Dynamics of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Enhanced
Geothermal Systems (EGS) in the USA, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2020 (2010); Rob
Wall & Tracey Crosbie, Potential for Reducing Electricity Demand for Lighting
in Households: An Exploratory Socio-technical Study, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 1021
(2009).
217. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 175–78.
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in complexity theory218 can make the task appear particularly
daunting. While the research-related suggestions articulated
above are likely to improve knowledge and enhance the ability
to create effective interventions into the global energy
system,219 the urgency and immense stakes of climate change
make it particularly important that progress toward a more
effective approach moves from theory to practice as quickly as
possible.220 To that end, this Part explores some of the key
attributes of reform suggested by viewing climate change as an
emergent property of the global energy system.
Energy-related legal reforms aimed at operationalizing
complexity theory may be aided by recognition that law itself
can be understood as a complex system, which operates within
the context of a broader complex governance system, which
forms a component of the global energy system, itself a part of
broader socio-ecological and socio-technical systems.221
Likewise, climate change represents alteration of the climate
system, which can be understood as a complex system
operating as a component of a broader “Earth system,” which
can also be understood to include the raw materials from which
energy is generated (including, but not limited to, fossil fuels).
This very broad description of the relevant interacting systems
reflects the concept of “panarchy,” which describes dynamic
processes within and across scales.222 It serves to illustrate the
multiple forces operating in and around the emergence of
climate change,223 which results most directly, of course, from
the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere—a byproduct of the
current energy system that affects the climate system in ways
that have been increasingly recognized and described by
scientists for over a century.224 Among other reasons, keeping

218. See supra Part II.
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. See generally PARRY ET AL., supra note 43 (discussing predicted
climate change impact scenarios).
221. As J.B. Ruhl suggests, “we must think of environmental law as a
complex adaptive system” in order to address complex environmental issues.
Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 980.
222. E.g., Holling, supra note 158, at 397–98, 401.
223. See supra Part II.
224. E.g., The Carbon Dioxide Greenhouse Effect, The Discovery of Global
Warming, AM. INST. PHYSICS, http://www.aip.org/history/climate/co2.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2014) (describing the history of the science behind climate
change).
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this broad perspective in mind when developing approaches to
mitigation can be helpful because it reminds us that the most
analytically simple approach to a specific problem may not be
the most desirable course of action and that we will likely fail
to achieve desired results if we fail to appreciate the context in
which legal reform efforts must operate. In the case of climate
change, the most analytically simple approach is probably
direct reduction of GHG emissions through specific targets (the
Kyoto Protocol’s goal), and repeated failures to successfully
implement this approach suggest that more contextuallysensitive alternative approaches are necessary to obtain the
desired result. Complex systems analysis offers a way of
thinking that is highly sensitive to context.
It may also prove useful to briefly consider whether
“ecosystem” or “economy,” as discussed above,225 provides a
better perspective for governance in this instance. Although the
goals of climate change regulation are undoubtedly relevant to
(and perhaps only comprehensible in terms of) the broad
planetary housekeeping implied by an ecosystem perspective,
efforts to impose environmental law controls through the
UNFCCC are efforts to inject an exogenous element into the
many interacting social and physical systems that create
climate change. On the other hand, employing a more
“economic” focus on energy governance reforms seeks to
promote changes to a human-imposed ordering (the energy
system) that interacts with broader ecosystem forces, and the
likelihood of prompting ripple effects throughout the humancreated energy system may be more readily assessed. Focusing
on energy governance rather than environmental harm may
thus help to understand the components subject to potential
policy action, as well as their interconnection with other
components of the system. Rather than imposing an alternative
framing of the issue (environmental harm), reforms that
conceptualize the energy system as a human-imposed ordering
of social and economic concerns may have the benefit of
focusing on modifications to existing arrangements within the
system that are most relevant to directing human behavior
(such as the relationship of various political interests in the

225. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
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energy system to other politically important interests that may
affect the ability to secure legal reforms).226
With these broad points in mind, the remainder of this
Part suggests that reforms may be most helpful to catalyzing
energy system transformation if they focus on: (1) framing
goals to secure political support; (2) reforming structural
arrangements to support technological transformation; and (3)
promoting interaction—among components of the energy
system and with components of related systems—that produces
beneficial effects for the communities involved while tending to
encourage transformation of the global energy system as a
whole. These elements of reform are discussed briefly below.
A. SIMPLE COMPLEXITY: POLITICAL AND IMPLEMENTATION
CONSIDERATIONS
Situating law and governance in systems terms—as
components of overlapping systems that operate across
multiple geographic and jurisdictional scales while intersecting
with various other policy spaces—highlights the need to remain
mindful of the interaction of each element of the governance
system with other governance system components and with
components of other systems. In a sense, it provides an
appropriately humble position from which to observe the global
political interaction that ultimately determines whether
governance regimes are created and reformed. Thus, it may be
that complexity theory appropriately “inculcates a sense of
uncertainty” in global political analysis.227 Policy proposals
drawn from complexity theory, which try to account for and
manage uncertainty, also tend to be relatively complex.228 For
example, the authors of the introduction to a special issue of
the journal Global Environmental Change on governing
complex SESs suggest that existing literature firmly supports
226. Cf. supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the issues related to energy
governance and geopolitics).
227. Neil E. Harrison, Complex Systems and the Practice of World Politics,
in COMPLEXITY IN WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW
PARADIGM 183, 193 (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006) (“[The complexity] paradigm
can increase our understanding of the complexity of world politics and reduce
the probability of surprising events.”).
228. For an example of a policy proposal to manage uncertainty, see
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 64–76
(2009).
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the notion that “in order to govern processes of complex change,
complexity in the external world must be matched by
complexity in the governance system.”229 They point to concepts
such as polycentric governance and adaptive governance, as
well as literature on network governance and other relatively
flexible approaches, as evidence of the concept’s broad
acceptance among scholars.230
Although both governance and political processes may be
accurately described by complexity analysis, success in politics
(domestically and, ultimately, globally) also requires gaining
widespread public support, particularly for the creation or
reform of mechanisms aimed at addressing controversial topics
like climate change.231 In part, the ability to gain favorable
public opinion depends upon the information costs (or mental
effort) required to understand the issues at stake and the
proposals for which support is sought, as well as their
alignment with existing political arrangements.232 Following
the principle of least effort, the human mind very often
operates like a reductionist machine that simplifies
information to reduce the effort of understanding it.233
Although it is certainly possible for people to grapple with
complexity, many seem to avoid it whenever possible.234 In the
context of climate policy, for example, social science evidence
suggests that people apply heuristic processing and align their
views with political elites rather than incur the information
costs (or apply the mental effort) to understand the scientific

229. Duit et al., supra note 136, at 365.
230. Id. at 365–67 (describing various articles on the issue).
231. E.g., Cynthia R. Rugeley & John D. Gerlach, Understanding
Environmental Public Opinion by Dimension: How Heuristic Processing
Mitigates High Information Costs on Complex Issues, 40 POL. & POL’Y 444,
445–46 (2012) (collecting literature on public opinion in the political process).
232. Id. at 463.
233. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 38 (2011) (observing
that people “normally avoid mental overload by dividing our tasks into
multiple easy steps” and “conduct [their] mental lives by the law of least
effort”).
234. Id. at 45 (“[M]any people . . . . apparently find cognitive effort at least
mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible.”). The bio-psychological
reasons for this appear to have an evolutionary origin. Id. at 35 (discussing
the positive emotional state triggered by cognitive ease as an evolutionarily
important biological signal). Although outside the scope of this Article, it is
interesting to consider how this perspective may help in understanding why
law and policy have historically been so reductionist.
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information necessary for an informed opinion.235 Therefore,
reforming energy policy on the basis of insights derived from
complexity theory will require presenting such proposals in
terms that are either readily accessible to the public or, more
likely, capable of gaining support from influential leaders.
Achieving such support on the global level, outside the context
of a pre-existing issue regime, poses a substantial obstacle that
will likely require context-specific analysis in order to achieve
concrete reforms in specific places or sectors.236 Although a full
discussion is outside of the scope of this Article, consideration
of key elements of a global approach can be identified and
briefly discussed. The first aspect of a global approach is the
identification of relatively clear goals that can guide reform
efforts and gain political support.
B. GOAL OF REFORM: CATALYZING TECHNOLOGICAL
TRANSFORMATION
The core purpose of reform as envisioned by this Article is
to reduce GHG emissions, and thereby mitigate climate change,
by dislodging the dominant place of fossil-fuel-dependent
technologies in the global energy system.237 The more rapidly,
decisively, and completely this transformation can occur
(without harmful social destabilization), the better. If one looks
at energy policy in traditional environmental or international
law terms (i.e., as the subject of traditional political science and
international relations analysis), the challenge may seem
overwhelming.238 From any perspective, it is daunting. But
complexity offers a lens through which rapid wholesale
transformation of the GHG-belching engines that drove the
Industrial Revolution into low-GHG clean tech for the

235. Cf. Rugeley & Gerlach, supra note 231, at 448–49 (“[I]n an effort to
mitigate [ ] information costs, citizens look to their political affiliations and
the media when forming public opinions on climate change.”). This type of
psychological simplification may also offer some explanation for why
environmental governance remains so reductionist and fragmented despite
the rising chorus of scientific and scholarly voices advocating adoption of
approaches that are better suited to environmental systems. See supra note
213 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part I.C.
237. Clearly, this goal is likely to incite opposition from fossil fuel interests,
see, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (2013),
which simply enhances the need for public support.
238. See supra Part I.D.
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information age becomes possible, but by no means certain, in a
way that appears inconceivable through a continuation of the
UNFCCC or other harm-focused approaches.239 In other areas
of environmental law, focusing squarely on the environmental
harm as a basis for reforms has frequently created a dynamic
in which legal regimes arise as reactions to a specific crisis that
triggers public and political responses.240 Following that course
in the climate context, as UNFCCC negotiations and much of
U.S. political discourse seems to be doing, may mean that
major social and economic disruption—perhaps even
catastrophe in the complex systems sense—will be required
before any meaningful legal response to climate change arises
on the global scale. A complexity perspective targeted toward
the global energy system offers a real alternative mode of
analysis that may reveal pathways to transformation that
averts the type of crises that have driven past environmental
law creation. Yet, by its very nature, the details of
transformation in a complex system cannot be fully predicted
or planned in advance. Whatever dream there might have been
for a grand global environmental regime implementing a plan
that charts a course to a future of universal environmental
sustainability is over and it should not be resurrected in the
guise of complexity. Instead, with an appreciation of context in
mind, the specific goals of reform should be formulated through
a broad and flexible approach to focus on promoting changes on
relatively small scales in ways that hold a potential to begin a
larger process of transformation.
The path toward energy system reform that complexity
suggests is far messier than an efficient and centralized
multilateral environmental regime modeled on the Montreal
Protocol (although it does not prevent the formation of
Montreal-like regimes where the conditions are right for them

239. See supra Part I.
240. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution
Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972:
Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 151 (2003) (observing that legislation and
other progress in protection of water quality “has often been driven by some
sort of crisis or series of events that thrusts an issue to the forefront of
political attention,” which results in “reactive decision-making” that may be
“short-sighted, geared to the political necessity of addressing a single, highly
charged issue”).
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to flourish).241 Instead, complexity theory suggests that
whatever hope remains for mitigating climate change at or
near the 2º target discussed in the UNFCCC context242 and by
the IPCC243 will only be achieved, if at all, through actions that
accrete and trigger reactions, expanding in a nonlinear fashion
similar to the dynamics that have created widespread concern
over catastrophic climate change impacts beyond certain
“tipping points.”244 The question for policymakers seeking to
employ complexity insights must be framed in terms of
measures that can set in motion and maintain systemic forces
that will result in technological transformation through
systems dynamics.245 In other words, while environmental law
has sought to prevent systemic change through restraints on
the inputs into physical or ecological systems, the goal of rapid
technological transformation will only be realized through
changes to the energy system components in ways that unleash
systemic change forces in the global energy system.

241. In fact, it has been argued that the evolution of the Montreal Protocol
reflects complex adaptive systems properties. Matthew J. Hoffmann, Beyond
Regime Theory: Complex Adaptation and the Ozone Regime, in COMPLEXITY IN
WORLD POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM 95, 108–11
(Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006). “Messy” is used here in the sense that J.B. Ruhl
describes in Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System.
Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 983 (describing environmental law reform as
“local, state, and federal structures [combining] their ‘genes,’ engag[ing] in the
political equivalent of sex, and mak[ing] the environmental law governance
system messy in the complex adaptive systems sense”).
242. The Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC, http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancunagreements/significance-of-the-key-agreements-reached-at-cancun/
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2014).
243. Peter Frumhoff, 2º C or Not 2º C: Insights from the Latest IPCC
Climate Report, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://blog.ucsusa.org/2-c-or-not-2-c-insights-from-the-latest-ipcc-climatereport-255.
244. For a discussion of “tipping points” and climate change, see Robert
Sanders, Report Warns of Climate Change “Tipping Points” Within Our
Lifetime, UC BERKLEY NEWS CENTER (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/12/03/report-warns-of-climate-change-tippingpoints-within-our-lifetime/.
245. E.g., Farber, supra note 138, at 152–53 (discussing the more unusual
situation of power laws, wherein “immeasurable variations in the current
state of affairs can lead over time to arbitrarily large divergences in eventual
outcomes”); Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 952 (describing the process by
which relatively small changes in the governance status quo may reverberate
through the system in ways that, over time, lead to a massive change or even
a transformation of the system).
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The concept of governance changes designed to promote
systemic change forces leading to a desirable outcome in partly
social systems has no apparent analogue in practice and has
just begun to appear in the literature.246 The approach is
discussed as “applied forward reasoning” in a recent article by
Levin et al., which begins to establish a framework for
examining specific situations based on a “reverse” application
of what is known about path dependency.247 The authors
suggest that exploring potential pathways through a sort of
reverse path dependency logic may enable some assessment of
the likelihood that particular policy changes will lead to
desirable, large-scale systemic transformation.248 Developing
applied forward reasoning or other in-depth analysis to identify
specific measures that can support the type of transformation
envisioned here may significantly reduce the uncertainty of
efforts to promote transformation of the global energy system,
bringing the goal more clearly within reach.
Two general policy targets help to clarify the types of
actions likely to advance the broader goal of dislodging fossil
energy’s dominance: technological innovation and technological
diffusion. These can be employed like a “rule of thumb,” such
that they offer a direction in which policy reforms can attempt
to move. Thus, taking actions that facilitate technological
innovation in as many contexts and potentially viable forms as
possible increases the chances of opening up the technological
horizon of possibility and achieving significant technological
breakthroughs. For example, promoting small-scale clean
energy projects around the globe through development aid and
policies of investment institutions serves to establish
“laboratories” for experimentation to address the technical
challenges of clean energy.249 Secondly, institutional
arrangements and legal rules that affect technological diffusion
246. It must be said, however, that J.B. Ruhl’s work in the late 1990s
strongly suggests such an approach and, in that sense as well as others, serves
as a forerunner of most of the other literature and conceptual developments
discussed in this Article. E.g., Ruhl, Thinking, supra note 9, at 952.
247. Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems:
Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45
POL’Y SCI. 123, 130–38 (2012).
248. Id. at 138–47.
249. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing “laboratories” for experimentation in the
context of states).
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(such as intellectual property rights laws) can be examined
with an eye toward revision that will pave the way for rapid
diffusion of significant technological advances. As Oran Young
suggested in the context of environmental institutions analysis:
“There is much to be said, under the circumstances, for
thinking systemically about institutional options in advance, so
that well-crafted options are available when crises open up
windows of opportunity for the introduction of substantial
institutional changes.”250 The same principle applies to
technological transformation and the mitigation challenge. If
circumstances, such as a price spike in fossil fuels, correspond
with technological change sufficiently to enable large-scale
change, it will be crucial to have governance arrangements in
place that can facilitate rapid and effective diffusion of
alternative technologies in order to maximize the opportunities
created. These goals suggest the need for attention to
governance relationships that, while perhaps far looser than
traditional environmental law regimes, can create an overarching structure to facilitate movement toward a significantly
lower GHG energy system.
C. POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS
Polycentric governance literature, particularly when
understood as an application of complexity concepts to
governance,251 suggests that challenges as complex and global
as climate change will require multiple layers of governance
that are designed to promote flexible experimentation and
cooperative learning, in line with the goals discussed above.252
The multiscalar nature of energy governance, as it currently
exists, could become an asset by incorporating elements from
both top-down systems and bottom-up efforts to allow small-

250. Oran R. Young, Institutional Dynamics: Resilience, Vulnerability and
Adaptation in Environmental and Resource Regimes, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 378, 384 (2010).
251. Although polycentric governance literature is not usually explicitly
tied to complexity concepts, the similarities are striking, particularly with
regard to self-organization and the apparent design of polycentric governance
structures to promote emergence through the interaction of various
authorities within a larger governance arrangement. Consider, for example,
the climate change governance strategy articulated in Ostrom, supra note 17,
at 551.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 249–50.
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scale experimentation and facilitate global learning.253 In
practical terms, this means enlisting “higher” scales of
governance (e.g., international) to facilitate finance for specific
clean energy projects and, equally important, to collect and
transmit lessons learned from them to future projects.
Moreover, it offers an opportunity to create guidance at the
global or international level that can promote energy system
improvements by fostering innovative and semi-autonomous
efforts at smaller-scales, perhaps through aligning funding
conditions with the global social and environmental priorities
that can promote multi-issue initiatives, including the goal of
technological innovation that may begin to trigger broader
changes in the system as experience accumulates.254 To be
effective, such arrangements will need to occur in a context
that creates trust among participants and enables productive
interaction, such as information sharing and technology
diffusion.255
D. LINKAGES AND INCENTIVES
Coordination of efforts across multiple scales throughout
the planet is not likely to simply self-organize for reasons
similar to those that have stalled UNFCCC efforts to fail. Chief
among these is the lack of incentives for many actors to accept
short-term individualized costs solely to promote a widely
shared future benefit.256 Accordingly, promoting innovation,

253. See Underdal, supra note 123, at 389–92 (noting different models for
collective action); see also Osofsky, supra note 2, at 241 (arguing that
addressing climate change policy requires resolution of “regulatory problems
that intersect with every level of government, from the most local to the most
global”).
254. In a similar vein, Sovacool suggests that polycentric approaches to
governance, which he describes as “so complex that there is no
guarantee . . . [of] optimal forms of governance,” “can offer an equitable,
inclusive, informative, accountable, protective, and adaptable framework” for
addressing the panoply of social and environmental challenges involved in
governing the global energy system. Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International
Comparison of Four Polycentric Approaches to Climate and Energy
Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3832, 3842 (2011).
255. See generally Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with
Climate Change 38–39 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
5095, 2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/pe/2009/04268.pdf
(recommending a multilevel approach to achieve emissions reduction).
256. Cf. supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting the traditional
theories used to solve collective-action problems).
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especially diffusion of technology, will likely depend heavily
upon the creation of appropriate incentives through financing
and, importantly, linkage with other significant social priorities
in particular geographic areas. The highly interconnected
nature of many issues related to energy creates an opportunity
to promote local priorities while also advancing global climate
change goals. Moreover, these considerations strongly caution
against a “single-minded” pursuit of one objective (such as
mitigation) to the exclusion or detriment of others (such as
biodiversity
preservation
or
well-being
of
affected
communities). These concepts have been discussed, to some
degree, in international environmental law literature,
especially work related to mitigation in the land use and
forestry sectors that advocates consideration of multiple issues
in the design of programs and reform of legal rules.
Many current REDD+ efforts in the forestry context have
begun to explore incorporation of climate, biodiversity, and
human development goals into holistic efforts.257 This is in
stark contrast to many of the existing incentives of investment
into developing countries for the purposes of meeting rising
demand,258 as well as many of the international environmental
law regimes.259 Understanding the multiple interacting
components of the global energy system can provide practical
guidance by highlighting the value of considering the multiple
forces that define a particular context. Clean energy projects
that are integrated with other priorities in specific contexts,
such as national or local agricultural or livelihood concerns,
may produce more robust results.
The Brazilian transition to ethanol in the 1970s–80s
illustrates this point and could serve as a model of sorts for

257. For a related analysis in the context of forestry emissions, see Long,
supra note 34, at 163 (“[These approaches] would overcome the fragmentation
and persistent divisions that have plagued prior efforts to address key
environmental issues . . . .”). For a discussion in the biodiversity context, see
generally Arnold, supra note 125, at 798 (describing the characteristics of
complex environmental problems and suggesting that they “demand that
environmental law and policy become increasingly integrationist and
multimodal”); see also Andrew Long, Developing Linkages to Preserve
Biodiversity, 21 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 41, 58–66 (2011).
258. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 68, at 66 (“[F]unding on energy
continues to support traditional centralized fossil fuel plants.”).
259. Long, supra note 257, at 42–43 (discussing fragmentation of
international environmental law).
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similar efforts on smaller scales.260 In Bangladesh, attention to
local livelihood needs and development of innovative financing
has enabled a broadly successful nonprofit effort to promote
small-scale renewable technologies that have significantly
reduced deforestation and provided direct health benefits to the
local population.261 Conceiving of the mitigation challenge as a
problem of reducing fossil fuel dominance in the global energy
system, with appropriate attention to the multiplicity of
interacting components to that system, supports developing
internationally applicable incentives for projects of this type
and, of equal importance, of developing the learning
infrastructure to allow them to be replicated and, where
possible, scaled-up.
V. CONCLUSION
Thinking about energy as a complex system from which
fossil fuel dominance and climate change emerge provides an
analytical and policy-relevant framework for exploring
pathways toward transforming that system. The linkage of
issues and scales of authority, highlighted briefly above, are
but two examples of how this might be operationalized.262
Literature since the 2009 UNFCCC negotiations in
Copenhagen is beginning to explore alternatives to top-down
binding international environmental agreements for catalyzing
successful mitigation, but it has yet to coalesce around an
analytical framework that can foster synergy and the
development of a cohesive body of work identifying and testing
viable options that are likely to produce solid policy
recommendations. A perspective on climate change informed by
an understanding of the global energy system as a complex
system has the potential to provide such a framework.
Further exploring the potential for an interdisciplinary
perspective on energy as a complex system may provide the

260. See Sovacool, supra note 254, at 3837–38 (discussing benefits of the
transition for workers and for soil productivity).
261. Id. at 3838–39.
262. Another possibility for affecting systemic forces is the reduction of
fossil fuel subsidies (or introduction of taxes or other pricing mechanisms) to
reduce the market distortions supporting fossil fuel dominance, which may
become more politically feasible as technological development reduces the cost
of alternatives. Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel:
Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 43, 79 (2008).
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analytical framework needed to accelerate the learning process
by uniting the somewhat disparate strands of thought that
have emerged since the “dream of Rio,” characterized by an
unjustified faith in global top-down environmentalism, came to
a crashing halt at the end of 2009. A complexity perspective on
energy as the source of climate change may unite many of the
developing approaches, which include work exploring nearterm approaches to climate change mitigation,263 detailed
analysis of particular aspects of the mitigation challenge if
developed outside of a unifying top-down structure,264 and
analytical expositions of polycentric governance theories in
climate-relevant ways.265 Viewed as a body of literature
addressing facets of a global complex systems challenge, such
work can be understood to contain the seeds of an approach
that is sufficiently salient to garner political support while also
probing for effective tools that will engage the multiple
interacting threads of social, ecological, and technical
components that affect the energy system across scales in order
to produce an overall shift that achieves climate stabilization.
There is much work to be done if we hope to bring about
the kind of transformation of the global energy system
necessary to reduce GHG emissions significantly and rapidly
enough to avoid drastic climate change impacts. A complexity
perspective strikes an appropriate balance between resigning
the global population to the massive suffering and
destabilization that climate change may bring, as a narrow
focus on developed country adaptation would do, and the
unwarranted faith in top-down global governance that much of
the previous decade’s climate change analysis exhibited. In this
sense, a complexity perspective on climate change urges a form
of governance reflecting the nature of adaptive systems
situated on the edge of chaos—advocating enough order to
avert disaster, while imbuing reform with the long-term
catalytic vision necessary to bring about the emergence of that
which is desirable, but remains uncertain and unpredictable.

263. E.g., Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks for Global Climate
Protection, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 341, 343–44 (2013).
264. E.g., Boyd, supra note 13, at 471–72.
265. E.g., Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions:
Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions
at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353, 355 (2010); Sovacool, supra note 254,
at 3835–40.
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